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Forward 
  
 
Computational models pervade all branches of the exact sciences and have in recent 
times also started to prove to be of immense utility in some of the traditionally 'soft' 
sciences like ecology, sociology and politics. This volume is a collection of a few cutting-
edge research papers on the application of variety of computational models and tools in 
the analysis, interpretation and solution of vexing real-world problems and issues in 
economics, management, ecology and global politics by some prolific researchers in the 
field. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the efficiency of an alternative to ratio estimator under the super 
population model with uncorrelated errors and a gamma-distributed auxiliary variable. 
Comparisons with usual ratio and unbiased estimators are also made. 
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1. Introduction 
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It is well known that the ratio method of  estimation occupies an important place 
in sample surveys. When the study variate y and the auxiliary variate x is positively 
(high) correlated, the ratio method of estimation is quite effective in estimating the 
population mean of the study variate y utilizing the information on auxiliary variate x. 
 Consider a finite population with N units and let xi and yi denote the values for 
two positively correlated variates x and y respectively for the ith unit in this population, 
i=1,2,…,N. Assume that the population mean X  of x is known. Let x  and y  be the 
sample means of x and y respectively based on a simple random sample of size n (n <  N) 
units drawn without replacement scheme. Then the classical ratio estimator for Y is 
defined by   
 
         )/( xXyyr =                                                      (1.1)        
 
The bias and mean square error (MSE) of ry are, up to second order moments,  
 ( ) ( ) XSSRyB yxxr −= 2λ                (1.2) 
M( ry )= ( )yxxy SRSRS 2222 −+λ ,               (1.3) 
where ( ) ( )nNnN −=λ , 
R= XY ,  ( ) ( )∑
=
− −−=
N
i
iy YyNS
1
212 1 ,s 2x = ( N-1)
1−  ∑
=
N
i 1
(xi - )X 2 , 
 
and yxS = (N-1)
1− ∑
=
N
i 1
(yi - ixY )( - )X . 
 
It is clear from (1.3) that M ( )ry  will be minimum when  
 
  R= 2xyx SS  = β  ,                                                                             (1.4) 
 
where β  is the regression coefficient of  y on x.  Also for R = β , 
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the bias of  ry  in ( 1.2) is zero.  That is,  ry   is almost unbiased for Y . 
 
 Let E (  xy )   = βα +  x   be the line of regression of y   on x , where E 
denotes averaging over all possible sample design simple random sampling without 
replacement (SRSWOR).Then    2xyx SS=β   and   βα +=Y X  so that, in general , 
 
    R = ( X/α  ) +  β                                              (1.5)  
 
It is obvious from (1.4) and (1.5) that any  transformation that brings the ratio of 
population means closer to  β  will be helpful in reducing the mean square error (MSE) 
as well as  the bias of the ratio estimator   ry . This led Srivenkataramana and Tracy 
(1986) to suggest an alternative to ratio estimator  ry  as 
   ( ) ( ){ }1// −−=+= xXAyAxXzy ra                           (1.6) 
 
which is based on the transformation 
               Ayz −=  ,                                                                   (1.7)  
 
where E( )() AYZz −==  and A is a suitably chosen scalar. 
 
 
 In this paper exact expressions of bias and MSE of ay  are worked out under a 
super population model and compared with the usual ratio estimator.  
 
 
2. The Super Population Model 
 
 Following Durbin (1959) and Rao (1968) it is assumed that the finite population 
under consideration is itself a random sample from a super population and the relation 
between x and y is of the form: 
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  βα +=iy  xi  +   ui   ;     ( i = 1,2,…,N)                                 (1.8) 
 
where α  and β  are  unknown real constants;  iu ’s are uncorrelated random errors with 
conditional (given xi) expectations 
 
    E ( ) 0=ii xu                                                   (1.9) 
 
    E  ( ) giii xxu δ=2                                              (1.10) 
 
( i=1,2,….,N), 〈∞〈δο , 2≤≤ gο  and xi are independently identically  
 
distributed ( i.i.d.)  with a common gamma density  
 
G ( ) θθ θ Γ= −− /1xe x , x ,ο〉 〈∞〈θ2   .                                                             (2.1) 
 
We will write Ex  to denote expectation operator with respect to the common distribution 
of  xi (i=1,2,3,…,N) and Ex Ec, as the over all expectation operator for the model. We 
denote a design by p and the design expectation Ep, for instance, see Chaudhuri and 
Adhikary (1983,89) and Shah and Gupta (1987). Let ‘s’ denote a simple random sample 
of N distinict labels chosen without replacement out of i=1,2,3……N.  Then 
 
  X(=N  X )  =  ∑
∈si
xi    +    ∑
∉si
xi                                                        (2.2) 
  
Following Rao and Webster (1966) we will utilize the distributional properties of  
xj / xi ,  ∑
∈si
ix ,  ∑
∉si
ix  ,  ∑
∈si
ix  /  ∑
∉si
ix   in our subsequent derivations. 
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3. The bias and mean square error  
   
 The estimator  ay   in (1.6) can be written as  
 
ay   =   ( )
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
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xN
xn
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based on a simple random sample of n distinct labels chosen without replacement out of   
i =  1,2,…,N. 
   
The bias 
 B = Ep  ( ay  - Y  )                                                   (3.2) 
 
of  ay  has model expectation Em(B) which works out as follows: 
 
Em  ( B ( ay ) ) = Ep Ex Ec ( ) ∑
∑∑
∈
=
∈⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
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- Ex Ec  ( βα + X ) 
 
=  Ep Ex βαβα −−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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i
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i
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i
i xNxnAXxNxn  Ex ( )X  
 
 
= Ex ( ) ( ) αα −⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ + ∑ ∑∑ ∑
∉ ∈∉ ∈
1/1//1/
si si
ii
si si
ii xxNnAxxNn  
 
=  ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1/1/ −−+ θθα nnNNn  
     -A ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } αθθ −−−−+ 11/1/ nnNNn  
 
= ( ) ( ) ( ){ }[ ]1/1/ −−+− θθα nNnNnNn  
      
     -A ( ) ( ) ( ){ }[ ]1// −−+−− θθ nNnnNNnN  
 
=  (N-n) ( ) ( )1/ −− θα nNA                                                                       (3.3) 
 
For SRSWOR sampling scheme , the mean square error  
   
   M ( )ay  = Ep  ( )2Yya −                                          (3.4) 
 
of ay has the following formula for model expectations 
  
Em (  M ( )ay )   : 
 
Em ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )[ ]21/222 22 −−−−+−+= θθαθ nnNAAnNNnnNyMEyM rma  
                               (3.5) 
where 
 10
              M ( ) ( )2YyEy rpr −=                                                                   (3.6) 
 
is the MSE  of ry  under SRSWOR scheme has the model expectation  
 
( )( ) ( ){ }
( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
Γ
+Γ
−+−+
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−+−+−+
+
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−−
−+
−=
θ
θ
θθ
θθθθθδ
θθ
αθ g
gngn
nNngngn
nn
nNNn
NnNyME rm
21
121
21
22
/
2
2
 
                (3.7) 
 
[ ])439.,1968(, pRaoSee  
Further, we note that for SRSWOR sampling scheme, the bias  
 
   ( ) ( )YyEyB rpr −=                                            (3.8) 
 
of usual ratio estimator has the model expectation 
 
 Em ( )( ) ( )αnNyB r −= /  ( )1−θn                         (3.9) 
 
We note from (3.3) and (3.9) that  
   
  ( )( )am yBE mE〈 ( )( )ryB  
if  
   ( ) αα 〈− A  
or if 
  ( ) 22 αα 〈− A  
or if  
  αο 2〈〈A                                                              (3.10) 
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Further we have from (3.5) that 
 
     Em ( )( ) ( )( ) ο<− rma yMEyM  
 
if  
     
( ) οα <− AA 22
 
or if 
     αο 2〈〈A                        (3.11) 
 
which is the same as in (3.10). 
Thus we state the following theorem: 
Theorem 3.1 : The estimator ay  is less biased as well as more efficient than usual ratio 
estimator ry  if  
    αο 2〈〈A  ( )οα ≠  
 
i . e . when A lies between  ο   and  α2 . 
Therefore , when intercept term ( )οα ≠  in the model (2.1) is sizable , there will be 
sufficient flexibility in picking A. 
  
 It is to be noted that for α = ry,ο   is unbiased and efficient than ay . 
The minimization of (3.5) with respect to A leads to  
  A  =  α  = Aopt (say)                                                    (3.12) 
 
Substitution of (3.12) in (3.5) yields the minimum value of  
 
( )( )asyME am  
min. Em ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]( )( )
( )
θ
θ
θθ
θθθθθδ
Γ
+Γ
−+−+
+−+−+−+−= g
gngn
nNngngn
N
NyM a 21
1211
2  
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          (3.13) 
 
which equals to ( )( ) .οα =whenyME rm  
It is interesting to note that when A = ay,α   is unbiased and attained its minimum average 
MSE in model (2.1). 
In practice the value of α  will have to be assessed, at the estimation stage, to be used as 
A. To assess α , we may use scatter diagram of y versus x for data from a pilot study, or a 
part of the data from the actual study and judge the y-intercept of the best fitting line. 
 
From (3.7)  and (3.13) we have  
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }2122.min 22 −−−+−=− θθαθ nnNnNNnnNyMEyME amrm 〉 ο                                              
                                                                                                                       (3.14)  
which shows that ay  is more efficient than ratio estimator when A =α  
is known exactly. For οα =  
 
   min.Em ( )( ) ( )( )rma yMEyM =                                  (3.15) 
For SRSWOR , the variance 
     V ( ) ( )2YyEy p −=                            (3.16) 
of usual unbiased estimator has the model expectation: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }[ ] nNgnNyVEm //2 θθδθβ Γ+Γ+−=                                         (3.17) 
 
The expressions of ( )( )am yME  and  ( )( )yVEm   are not easy task to compare 
algebraically. Therefore in order to facilitate the comparison, denoting 
 
( )( ) ( )( )amm yMEyVEE /1001 =   and ( )( ) ( )( )amrm yMEyVEE /1002 = , 
 
we present below in tables 1,2,3, the values of the relative efficiencies of  
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ay with respect to y  and ry  for a few combination of the parametric values under the 
model (2.1). Values are given for N = 60 , 5.0,8,0.2 === αθδ , 1.0, 1.5, 
5.1,0.1,5.0=β  and g = 0.0, 0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0.  The ranges of A, for ay   to be better than ry  
for given 5.1,0.1,5.0=α  are respectively ( 0,1), ( 0,2), (0,3). This clearly indicates that as 
the size of  
α  increases the range of A for ay  to be better than ry  increases i.e. flexibility of 
choosing A increases.  
 
We have made the following observations from the tables 1,2 and 3 :  
 
     (i)          As  g   increases both  E1 and E2 decrease. When  n increases               E1 
increases while E2 decreases.  
(ii) As α  increases ( i.e. if the intercept term α  departs from origin in positive 
direction) relative efficiency of ay  with respect to y  decreases while E2 
increases.  
(iii) As β  increases E1 increases for fixed g while E2 is unaffected.  
(iv) The maximum gain in efficiency is observed over y  as well as over ry  if A 
coincide with the value of α . Finally, the estimator ay is to be preferred 
when the intercept term α  departs substantially from origin.  
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Table 1: Relative efficiencies of ay  with respect to y  and Γy  
5.0=α  
  g β                          n = 10 
E1 E2 
A A 
  
0.30 0.60 0.90 0.30 0.60 0.90 
0.5 192.86 193.23 191.40 101.34 101.54 100.57 
1.0 482.16 483.16 478.09 101.34 101.54 100.57 0.0 
1.5 964.32 966.17 956.98 101.34 101.54 100.57 
        
 0.5 132.67 132.77 132.30 100.49 100.56 100.21 
0.5 1.0 237.82 237.99 237.16 100.49 100.56 100.21 
 1.5 413.08 413.36 411.93 100.49 100.56 100.21 
        
 0.5 111.06 111.08 110.95 10.17 100.19 100.07 
1.0 1.0 148.08 
 
148.11 147.93 10.17 100.19 100.07 
 1.5 209.78 209.83 209.57 10.17 100.19 100.07 
        
 0.5 103.99 104.00 103.96 100.06 100.07 100.03 
1.5 1.0 116.64 116.65 116.60 100.06 100.07 100.03 
 1.5 137.71 137.72 137.66 100.06 100.07 100.03 
        
 0.5 102.23 102.23 102.22 100.02 100.02 100.01 
2.0 1.0 106.43 106.43 106.42 100.02 100.02 100.01 
 1.5 113.43 113.43 113.42 100.02 100.02 100.01 
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5.0=α  
  g β                          n = 20 
E1 E2 
A A 
  
0.30 0.60 0.90 0.30 0.60 0.90 
0.5 196.58 196.96 195.11 103.33 101.52 100.56 
1.0 491.46 492.39 487.77 103.33 101.52 100.56 0.0 
1.5 982.92 984.39 975.53 103.33 101.52 100.56 
        
 0.5 134.37 134.46 134.46 100.48 100.55 100.20 
0.5 1.0 240.86 241.02 240.02 100.48 100.55 100.20 
 1.5 418.35 418.63 417.20 100.48 100.55 100.20 
        
 0.5 111.76 111.79 111.65 100.17 100.19 100.07 
1.0 1.0 149.01 149.05 148.87 100.17 100.19 100.07 
 1.5 211.10 211.16 210.90 100.17 100.19 100.07 
        
 0.5 104.00 104.00 103.96 100.06 100.07 100.02 
1.5 1.0 116.64 116.65 116.60 100.06 100.07 100.02 
 1.5 137.71 137.73 137.67 100.06 100.07 100.02 
        
 0.5 101.60 101.60 101.58 100.02 100.02 100.01 
2.0 1.0 105.77 105.77 105.76 100.02 100.02 100.01 
 1.5 112.73 112.73 112.73 100.02 100.02 100.01 
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Table 2: Relative efficiencies of ay with respect to y  and ry  
0.1=α   
  g β                                                   n = 10 
E1 E2  
A A 
  
0.50 1.0 1.50          1.90 0.50 1.0 1.50 1.90 
0.5 190.31 193.36 190.31    183.82 104.73 106.41 104.73 101.16 
1.0 475.78 483.40 475.78    459.55 104.73 106.41 104.73 101.16 0.0 
1.5 951.55 966.79 951.55    919.10 104.73 106.41 104.73 101.16 
         
 0.5 132.03 132.80 132.03    130.34 101.73 102.32 101.73 100.43 
0.5 1.0 236.67 238.05 236.67    233.65 101.73 102.32 101.73 100.43 
 1.5 411.07 413.46 411.07    405.82 101.73 102.32 101.73 100.43 
         
 0.5 110.87 111.09 110.87    110.36 100.61 100.82 100.61 100.15 
1.0 1.0 147.82 148.12 147.82    147.15 100.61 100.82 100.61 100.15 
 1.5 209.42 209.84 209.42    208.46 100.61 100.82 100.61 100.15 
         
 0.5 103.93 104.00 103.93    103.77 100.21 100.28 100.21 100.05 
1.5 1.0 116.57 116.65 116.57    116.39 100.21 100.28 100.21 100.05 
 1.5 137.63 137.73 137.63    137.41 100.21 100.28 100.21 100.05 
         
 0.5 102.21 102.23 102.21    102.15 100.67 100.09 100.07 100.01 
2.0 1.0 106.41 106.43 106.41     106.3 100.67 100.09 100.07 100.01 
 1.5 113.41 113.43 113.41    113.35 100.67 100.09 100.07 100.01 
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0.1=α   
  g β                                                   n = 20 
E1 E2  
A A 
  
0.50 1.0 1.50          1.90 0.50 1.0 1.50 1.90 
0.5 194.01 197.08 194.01    187.47 104.67 106.33 104.67 101.14 
1.0 485.03 492.70 485.03    468.68 104.67 106.33 104.67 101.14 0.0 
1.5 970.06 985.40 970.06    937.36 104.67 106.33 104.67 101.14 
         
 0.5 133.73 134.49 133.73   132.05 101.70 102.28 101.70 100.08 
0.5 1.0 239.71 241.08 239.71    236.71 101.70 102.28 101.70 100.08 
 1.5 416.35 418.73 416.35    411.13 101.70 102.28 101.70 100.08 
         
 0.5 111.07 111.08 111.07    111.08 100.60 100.80 100.60 100.15 
1.0 1.0 148.77 149.06 148.77   148.11 100.60 100.80 100.60 100.15 
 1.5 210.75 211.17 210.75    209.82 100.60 100.80 100.60 100.15 
         
 0.5 103.94 104.01 103.94    103.78 100.20 100.27 100.20 100.05 
1.5 1.0 116.57 116.65 116.57    116.40 100.20 100.27 100.20 100.05 
 1.5 137.64 137.73 137.64   137.42 100.20 100.27 100.20 100.05 
         
 0.5 101.58 101.60 101.58   101.52 100.07 100.09 100.07 100.01 
2.0 1.0 105.75 105.77 105.75   105.70   100.07 100.09 100.07 100.01 
 1.5 112.71 112.73 112.71   112.65 100.07 100.09 100.07 100.01 
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Table 3: Relative efficiencies of ay with respect to y  and ry  
5.1=α  
  g β                                                   n = 10 
E1 E2 
A A 
  
0.60 1.20 1.80       2.40       2.90 0.60 1.20 1.80 2.40      2.90 
0.5 183.82 192.25 192.25     183.82  
171.79 
108.77 113.76 113.76 108.77   
101.65 
1.0 459.55 480.62 480.62     459.55  
429.47 
108.77 113.76 113.76 108.77   
101.65 
0.0 
1.5 919.10 961.25 961.25     919.10  
858.94 
108.77 113.76 113.76 108.77   
101.65 
         
 0.5 130.34 132.52 132.52     130.34  
127.01 
103.29 105.01 105.01 103.29   
100.64 
0.5 1.0 233.64 237.55 237.55     233.65  
227.67 
103.29 105.01 105.01 103.29   
100.64 
 1.5 405.82 412.60 412.60     405.82  
395.44 
103.29 105.01 105.01 103.29   
100.64 
         
 0.5 110.36 111.01 111.01     110.36  
109.34 
101.17 101.77 101.77 101.17   
100.23 
1.0 1.0 147.15 148.02 148.02     147.15  
147.79 
101.17 101.77 101.77 101.17   
100.23 
 1.5 208.46 209.69 209.69     208.46  
206.53 
101.17 101.77 101.77 101.17   
100.23 
         
 0.5 103.77 103.98 103.98     103.77  
103.44 
100.40 100.60 100.60 100.40   
100.08 
1.5 1.0 116.39 116.62 116.62     116.39  100.40 100.60 100.60 100.40   
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116.01 100.08 
 1.5 137.41 137.69 137.69    137.41  
139.68 
100.40 100.60 100.60 100.40   
100.08 
         
 0.5 102.15 102.22 102.22     102.15  
102.04 
100.13 100.20 100.20 100.13   
100.03 
2.0 1.0 106.35 106.42 106.42     106.35  
106.24 
100.13 100.20 100.20 100.13   
100.03 
 1.5 113.35 113.42 113.42     113.35  
113.23 
100.13 100.20 100.20 100.13   
100.03 
 
 
 
5.1=α  
  G β                                                   n = 20 
E1 E2  
A  
  
0.60 1.20 1.80       2.40       2.90 0.60 1.20 1.80 2.40        2.90 
0.5 187.47 196.97 195.97    187.47  
175.33 
108.67 113.59 113.59 108.67   
101.63 
1.0 468.68 489.91 489.91    468.68  
438.34 
108.67 113.59 113.59 108.67   
101.63 
0.0 
1.5 937.36 979.83 979.83    937.36  
876.67 
108.67 113.59 113.59 108.67   
101.63 
         
 0.5 132.05 134.21 134.21    132.05  
128.73 
103.23 104.92 104.92 103.23   
100.63 
0.5 1.0 236.70 240.58 240.58     236.70  
230.76 
103.23 104.92 104.92 103.23   
100.63 
 1.5 411.13 417.87 417.87     411.13  
400.80 
103.23 104.92 104.92 103.23   
100.63 
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 0.5 111.08 111.72 111.72    111.08  
110.08 
101.14 101.72 101.72 101.14   
100.23 
1.0 1.0 148.11 148.96 148.96    148.11  
146.77 
101.14 101.72 101.72 101.14   
100.23 
 1.5 209.82 211.02 211.02    209.82  
207.92 
101.14 101.72 101.72 101.14   
100.23 
         
 0.5 103.78 103.98 103.98    103.78  
103.46 
100.39 100.58 100.58 100.39   
100.08 
1.5 1.0 116.40 116.62 116.62    116.40  
116.40 
100.39 100.58 100.58 100.39   
100.08 
 1.5 137.43 137.70 137.70    137.43  
137.00 
100.39 100.58 100.58 100.39   
100.08 
         
 0.5 101.53 101.59 101.59    101.53  
101.42 
100.13 100.19 100.19 100.03   
100.03 
2.0 1.0 105.70 105.77 105.77    105.70  
105.59 
100.13 100.19 100.19 100.03   
100.03 
 1.5 112.65 112.72 112.72    112.65  
112.54 
100.13 100.19 100.19 100.03   
100.03 
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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a class of estimators for population correlation coefficient 
when information about the population mean and population variance of one of the 
variables is not available but information about these parameters of another variable 
(auxiliary) is available, in two phase sampling and analyzes its properties. Optimum 
estimator in the class is identified with its variance formula. The estimators of the class 
involve unknown constants whose optimum values depend on unknown population 
parameters.Following (Singh, 1982) and (Srivastava and Jhajj, 1983), it has been shown 
that when these  population parameters are replaced by their consistent estimates the 
resulting class of estimators has the same asymptotic variance as that of optimum 
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estimator. An empirical study is carried out to demonstrate  the performance of the 
constructed estimators. 
 
Keywords: Correlation coefficient, Finite population, Auxiliary information, Variance. 
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1. Introduction  
Consider a finite population U= {1,2,..,i,..N}. Let y and x be the study and auxiliary 
variables taking values yi and xi respectively for the ith unit. The correlation coefficient 
between y and x is defined by 
 
   yxρ  = Syx /(SySx)    (1.1) 
where 
( ) ( )( )XxYyNS iN
i
iyx −−−= ∑
=
−
1
11 , ( ) ( )∑
=
− −−=
N
i
ix XxNS
1
212 1 , ( ) ( )∑
=
− −−=
N
i
iy YyNS
1
212 1 ,
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N
i
ixNX
1
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=
−=
N
i
iyNY
1
1 . 
Based on a simple random sample of size  n drawn without replacement,  
 (xi , yi), i = 1,2,…,n; the usual estimator of yxρ is the corresponding sample correlation 
coefficient :  
   r= syx /(sxsy)     (1.2) 
where ( ) ( )( )xxyyns in
i
iyx −−−= ∑
=
−
1
11 , ( ) ( )∑
=
− −−=
n
i
ix xxns
1
212 1  
( ) ( )∑
=
− −−=
n
i
iy yyns
1
212 1 , ∑
=
−=
n
i
iyny
1
1 , ∑
=
−=
n
i
ixnx
1
1 . 
The problem of estimating yxρ  has been earlier taken up by various authors including 
(Koop, 1970), (Gupta et. al., 1978, 1979), (Wakimoto, 1971), (Gupta and Singh, 1989), 
(Rana, 1989) and (Singh et. al., 1996) in different situations. (Srivastava and Jhajj, 1986) 
have further considered the problem of estimating yxρ  in the situations where the 
 24
information on auxiliary variable x for all units in the population is available. In such 
situations, they have suggested a class of estimators for yxρ  which utilizes the known 
values of the population mean X and the population variance 2xS of the auxiliary variable 
x.  
 In this paper, using two – phase sampling mechanism, a class of estimators for 
yxρ in the presence of the available knowledge ( Z  and 2zS ) on second auxiliary variable z 
is considered, when the population mean X  and population variance 2xS of the main 
auxiliary variable x are not known.  
 
2. The Suggested Class of Estimators  
 In many situations of practical importance, it may happen that no information is 
available on the population mean X  and population variance 2xS , we seek to estimate the 
population correlation coefficient yxρ  from a sample ‘s’ obtained through a two-phase 
selection. Allowing simple random sampling without replacement scheme in each phase, 
the two- phase sampling scheme will be as follows: 
(i)  The first phase sample ∗s  ( )Us ⊂∗  of fixed size 1n , is drawn to observe only x in 
order to furnish a good estimates of X  and 2xS . 
(ii)  Given  ∗s , the second- phase sample s ( )∗⊂ ss   of fixed size n is drawn to 
observe y only.  
Let 
( )∑
∈
=
si
ixnx 1 , ( )∑
∈
=
si
iyny 1 , ( )∑
∗∈
∗ =
si
ixnx 11 , ( ) ( )∑
∈
− −−=
si
ix xxns
212 1 , 
( ) ( )∑
∗∈
∗−∗ −−=
si
ix xxns
21
1
2 1 . 
We write ∗= xxu , 22 ∗= xx ssv . Whatever be the sample chosen let (u,v) assume values in 
a bounded closed convex subset, R, of the two-dimensional real space containing the 
point (1,1). Let h (u, v) be a function of u and v such that  
  h(1,1)=1                         (2.1) 
and such that it satisfies the following conditions:  
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1.  The function h (u,v) is continuous and bounded in R.  
2. The first and second partial derivatives of h(u,v) exist and are continuous and 
bounded in R. 
Now one may consider the class of estimators of yxρ defined by  
 ),(ˆ vuhrhd =ρ                   (2.2) 
which is double sampling version of the class of estimators  
 
 ),(~ ∗∗= vufrrt  
                                                           
Suggested by (Srivastava and Jhajj, 1986), where Xxu =∗ , 22 xx Ssv =∗  and ( )2, xSX  are 
known.  
 Sometimes even if the population mean X  and population variance 2xS  of x are 
not known, information on a cheaply ascertainable variable z, closely related to x but 
compared to x remotely   related to y, is available on all units of the population. This type 
of situation has been briefly discussed by, among others, (Chand, 1975), (Kiregyera, 
1980, 1984).  
Following (Chand, 1975) one may define a chain ratio- type estimator for yxρ  as  
  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∗
∗
∗
∗
2
2
2
2
1ˆ
z
z
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S
s
s
z
Z
x
xrρ                (2.3) 
where the population mean Z   and population variance 2zS  of second auxiliary variable z are 
known, and   
  ( )∑
∗∈
∗ =
si
iznz 11 , ( ) ( )∑
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∗−∗ −−=
si
iz zzns
21
1
2 1    
are the sample mean and sample variance of z based on preliminary large sample s*  of 
size n1 (>n). 
 
 The estimator d1ρˆ  in (2.3) may be generalized as  
 
4321
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2
2
2ˆ
αααα
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where  si 'α  (i=1,2,3,4) are suitably chosen constants.  
Many other generalization of  d1ρˆ is possible. We have, therefore, considered a 
more general class of yxρ  from which a number of estimators can be generated.  
 The proposed generalized estimators for population correlation coefficient yxρ  is 
defined by  
  ),,,(ˆ awvutrtd =ρ                 (2.5) 
where Zzw ∗= , 22 zz Ssa ∗= and t(u,v,w,a) is a function of (u,v,w,a) such that  
  t (1,1,1,1)=1                       (2.6) 
Satisfying the following conditions:  
(i)  Whatever be the samples (s* and s) chosen, let (u,v,w,a) assume values in a closed 
convex subset S, of the four dimensional real space containing the point P=(1,1,1,1). 
(ii) In S, the function t(u,v,w,a) is continuous and bounded.   
(iii) The first and second order partial derivatives of t(u,v,w, a) exist and are 
continuous and bounded in S 
To find the bias and variance of  tdρˆ we write  
)1(),1(),1(),1(
)1(),1(),1(),1(
*
4
22**
3
**
2
22*
2
22*
111
22
syxyxzzxx
xxyy
eSseSseZzeSs
eSseXxeXxeSs
+=+=+=+=
+=+=+=+= ∗
 
such that E(e0) =E (e1)=E(e2)=E(e5)=0 and E(ei*) = 0 ∀    i = 1,2,3,4,  
and ignoring the finite population correction terms, we write to  the first degree of 
approximation 
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where  
( )2/0022/0202/200 mqppqmpqm μμμμδ = , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
−−−=
N
i
m
i
q
i
p
ipqm ZzXxYyN
1
1μ , (p,q,m) being 
non-negative integers. 
To find the expectation and variance of  tdρˆ , we expand t(u,v,w,a) about the point  
P= (1,1,1,1) in a second- order Taylor’s series, express this value and the value of r in 
terms of e’s . Expanding in powers of e’s and retaining terms up to second power, we 
have  
 E( tdρˆ )= ( )1−+ noyxρ         (2.7) 
 
which shows that the bias of tdρˆ is of the order n-1and so up to order n-1 , mean square 
error and the variance of  tdρˆ  are same. 
 Expanding ( )2ˆ yxtd ρρ − , retaining terms up to second power in e’s, taking 
expectation and using the above expected values, we obtain the variance of tdρˆ  to the 
first degree of approximation, as  
 28
)]()(2)()(2)()()(
)()()1()()()1()()[/(
)]()(2)()()()1()()[/()()ˆ(
4300321030432
1
2
4004
2
3
22
2040
2
1
2
1
2
2103021
2
2040
2
1
22
PtPtCPtPtCPtFPDtPBt
PAtPtPtCPtPtCn
PtPtCPBtPAtPtPtCnrVarVar
zx
zxyx
xxyxtd
δδ
δδρ
δδρρ
−+++
−−−−−−+−
+−−−++=
 
                       (2.8) 
where t1(P), t2(P), t3(P)and t4(P) respectively denote the first partial derivatives of 
t(u,v,w,a) white respect to u,v,w and a respectively at the point P= (1,1,1,1), 
Var(r)= ( ) }]/){()2)(4/1(/)[/( 31013022040004022202 yxyxyx n ρδδδδδρδρ +−+++     (2.9)                                            
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Any parametric function t(u,v,w,a) satisfying (2.6) and the conditions (1) and (2) can 
generate an estimator of the class(2.5). 
 
The variance of tdρˆ  at (2.6) is minimized for 
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Thus the resulting (minimum) variance of tdρˆ  is given by  
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 It is observed from (2.11) that if optimum values of the parameters given by 
(2.10) are used, the variance of the estimator tdρˆ  is always less than that of r as the last 
two terms on the right hand sides of (2.11) are non-negative. 
 Two simple functions t(u,v,w,a) satisfying the required conditions are 
 
t(u,v,w,a)= 1+ )1()1()1()1( 4321 −+−+−+− awvu αααα  
4321),,,( αααα awvuawvut =  
and for both these functions t1(P) = 1α , t2 (P) = 2α , t3 (P) = 3α  and t4 (P) = 4α . Thus one 
should use optimum values of 1α , 2α , 3α and 4α in tdρˆ  to get the minimum variance. It is 
to be noted that the estimated tdρˆ  attained the minimum variance only when the optimum 
values of the constants iα  (i=1,2,3,4), which are functions of unknown population 
parameters, are known. To use such estimators in practice, one has to use some guessed 
values of population parameters obtained either through past experience or through a 
pilot sample survey. It may be further noted that even if the values of the constants used 
in the estimator are not exactly equal to their optimum values as given by (2.8) but are 
close enough, the resulting estimator will be better than the conventional estimator, as has 
been illustrated by (Das and Tripathi, 1978, Sec.3). 
If no information on second auxiliary variable z is used, then the estimator tdρˆ  
reduces to hdρˆ  defined in (2.2). Taking z ≡  1 in (2.8), we get the variance of hdρˆ   to the 
first degree of approximation, as    
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which is minimized for 
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Thus the minimum variance of hdρˆ  is given by 
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It follows from (2.11) and (2.14) that 
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which is always positive. Thus the proposed estimator tdρˆ  is always better than hdρˆ .     
 
3. A Wider Class of Estimators 
    In this section we consider a class of estimators of yxρ  wider than ( 2.5) given by  
                                                      gdρˆ =g(r,u,v,w,a)                                       (3.1) 
       
where g(r,u,v,w,a) is a function of r,u,v, w,a  and such that  
g( ρ ,1,1,1,1)= tdρˆ  and 
)1,1,1,(
)(
ρ
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
⋅∂
r
g = 1 
Proceeding as in section 2, it can easily be shown, to the first order of approximation, that 
the minimum variance of gdρˆ  is same as that of tdρˆ    given in (2.11). 
It is to be noted that the difference-type estimator           
rd= r + 1α  (u-1)  + 2α  (v-1) + 3α  (w-1) + 4α  (a-1), is a particular case of gdρˆ  , but it is 
not the member of tdρˆ  in (2.5). 
 
4. Optimum Values and Their Estimates 
 
The optimum values t1(P) = α , t2(P) = β  , t3(P) = γ   and  t4(P) =δ   given at 
(2.10) involves unknown population parameters. When these optimum values are 
substituted in (2.5) , it no longer remains an estimator since it involves unknown 
(α , β ,γ ,δ ), which are functions of unknown population parameters, say,, pqmδ  (p, q,m= 
0,1,2,3,4), Cx, Cz and  yxρ  itself. Hence it is advisable to replace them by their consistent 
estimates from sample values. Let ( δγβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ) be consistent estimators of t1(P),t2(P), 
t3(P) and  t4(P) respectively, where  
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with  
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We then replace (α , β ,γ ,δ ) by ( δγβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ) in the optimum tdρˆ resulting in the estimator 
∗
tdρˆ  say, which is defined by  
 
                      )ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,,,,(ˆ ** δγβαρ awvutrtd = ,                                       (4.2) 
 
where the function t*(U), U= ( δγβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,,,, awvu ) is derived from the the function 
t(u,v,w,a) given at (2.5) by replacing the unknown constants involved in it by the 
consistent estimates of optimum values. The condition (2.6) will then imply that  
                              t*(P*) = 1                                                             (4.3)            
 where              P* = (1,1,1,1, α , β ,γ ,δ )    
 We further assume that  
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Expanding t*(U) about P*= (1,1,1,1, α , β ,γ ,δ ), in Taylor’s series, we have 
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Using (4.4) in (4.5) we have 
 
terms]ordersecond)1()1()1()1(1[ˆ * +−+−+−+−+= δγβαρ awvurtd                      (4.6) 
 
                                                    
Expressing (4.6) in term of e’s squaring and retaining terms of e’s up to second degree, 
we have 
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Taking expectation of both sides in (4.7), we get the variance of ∗tdρˆ to the first degree of 
approximation, as 
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which is same as (2.11), we thus have established the following result. 
 
Result 4.1: If optimum values of constants in (2.10) are replaced by their consistent 
estimators and conditions (4.3) and (4.4) hold good, the resulting estimator *ˆ tdρ  has the 
same variance to the first degree of approximation, as that of optimum tdρˆ . 
 
Remark 4.1: It may be easily examined that some special cases: 
 
(i) ,ˆ ˆˆˆˆ* 1 δγβαρ awvurtd =  (ii) 
)}1(ˆ)1(ˆ1{
)}1(ˆ)1(ˆ1{ˆ * 2 −−−−
−+−+=
av
wurtd δβ
γαρ  
 
(iii) )]1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆ1[ˆ * 3 −+−+−+−+= awuurtd δγβαρ  
 
(iv) 1* 4 )]1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆ1[ˆ −−−−−−−−−= awuurtd δγβαρ  
 
of *ˆ tdρ satisfy the conditions (4.3) and (4.4) and attain the variance (4.8). 
 
Remark 4.2: The efficiencies of the estimators discussed in this paper can be compared 
for fixed cost, following the procedure given in (Sukhatme et. al., 1984). 
 
5. Empirical Study 
                          To illustrate the performance of various estimators of population 
correlation coefficient, we consider the data given in (Murthy, 1967,  p. 226].  The 
variates are: 
y=output, x=Number of Workers, z =Fixed Capital 
N=80,  n=10,   n1 =25 ,    
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,875.283=X  ,638.5182=Y  ,1126=Z  ,9430.0=xC  ,3520.0=yC ,7460.0=zC  
,030.1003 =δ   ,8664.2004 =δ  ,1859.1021 =δ  ,1522.3022 =δ  ,295.1030 =δ  ,65.3040 =δ        
,7491.0102 =δ    ,9145.0120 =δ     ,8234.0111 =δ      ,8525.2130 =δ        
,5454.2112 =δ ,5475.0210 =δ ,3377.2220 =δ ,4546.0201 =δ ,2208.2202 =δ ,1301.0300 =δ
,2667.2400 =δ ,9136.0=yxρ        ,9859.0=xzρ      9413.0=yzρ . 
The percent relative efficiencies (PREs) of d1ρˆ , hdρˆ , tdρˆ  with respect to conventional 
estimator r have been computed and compiled in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: The PRE’s of different estimators of yxρ  
Estimator r hdρˆ  tdρˆ (or ∗tdρˆ ) 
PRE(.,r) 100 129.147 305.441 
 
Table 5.1 clearly shows that the proposed estimator  tdρˆ (or ∗tdρˆ ) is more efficient 
than  r and hdρˆ . 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we have proposed a semi-heuristic optimization algorithm for designing 
optimal plant layouts in process-focused manufacturing/service facilities. Our proposed 
algorithm marries the well-known CRAFT (Computerized Relative Allocation of 
Facilities Technique) with the Hungarian assignment algorithm. Being a semi-heuristic 
search, our algorithm is likely to be more efficient in terms of computer CPU engagement 
time as it tends to converge on the global optimum faster than the traditional CRAFT 
algorithm - a pure heuristic. We also present a numerical illustration of our algorithm.  
 
Key Words: Facilities layout planning, load matrix, CRAFT, Hungarian assignment 
algorithm 
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Introduction 
 
The fundamental integration phase in the design of productive systems is the layout of 
production facilities.  A working definition of layout may be given as the arrangement of 
machinery and flow of materials from one facility to another, which minimizes material-
handling costs while considering any physical restrictions on such arrangement. Usually 
this layout design is either on considerations of machine-time cost and product 
availability; thereby making the production system product-focused; or on considerations 
of quality and flexibility; thereby making the production system process-focused. It is 
natural that while product-focused systems are better off with a ‘line layout’ dictated by 
available technologies and prevailing job designs, process-focused systems, which are 
more concerned with job organization, opt for a ‘functional layout’. Of course, in reality 
the actual facility layout often lies somewhere in between a pure line layout and a pure 
functional layout format; governed by the specific demands of a particular production 
plant. Since our present paper concerns only functional layout design for process-focused 
systems, this is the only layout design we will discuss here.  
 
The main goal to keep in mind is to minimize material handling costs - therefore the 
departments that incur the most interdepartmental movement should be located closest to 
one another. The main type of design layouts is Block diagramming, which refers to the 
movement of materials in existing or proposed facility. This information is usually 
provided with a from/to chart or load summary chart, which gives the average number of 
units loads moved between departments. A load-unit can be a single unit, a pallet of 
material, a bin of material, or a crate of material. The next step is to design the layout by 
calculating the composite movements between departments and rank them from most 
movement to least movement. Composite movement refers to the back-and-forth 
movement between each pair of departments. Finally, trial layouts are placed on a grid 
that graphically represents the relative distances between departments. This grid then 
becomes the objective of optimization when determining the optimal plant layout. 
 We give a visual representation of the basic operational considerations in a process-
focused system schematically as follows: 
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Figure 1 
 
In designing the optimal functional layout, the fundamental question to be addressed is 
that of ‘relative location of facilities’. The locations will depend on the need for one pair 
of facilities to be adjacent (or physically close) to each other relative to the need for all 
other pairs of facilities to be similarly adjacent (or physically close) to each other. 
Locations must be allocated based on the relative gains and losses for the alternatives and 
seek to minimize some indicative measure of the cost of having non-adjacent locations of 
facilities. Constraints of space prevents us from going into the details of the several 
criteria used to determine the gains or losses from the relative location of facilities and 
the available sequence analysis techniques for addressing the question; for which we refer 
the interested reader to any standard handbook of production/operations management. 
 
 
Computerized Relative Allocation of Facilities Technique (CRAFT) 
 
CRAFT (Buffa, Armour and Vollman, 1964) is a computerized heuristic algorithm that 
takes in load matrix of interdepartmental flow and transaction costs with a representation 
of a block layout as the inputs. The block layout could either be an existing layout or; for 
a new facility, any arbitrary initial layout. The algorithm then computes the departmental 
locations and returns an estimate of the total interaction costs for the initial layout. The 
governing algorithm is designed to compute the impact on a cost measure for two-way or 
Updating skills and 
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particular process 
Routing in-process items to 
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three-way swapping in the location of the facilities. For each swap, the various 
interaction costs are computed afresh and the load matrix and the change in cost (increase 
or decrease) is noted and stored in the RAM. The algorithm proceeds this way through all 
possible combinations of swaps accommodated by the software. The basic procedure is 
repeated a number of times resulting in a more efficient block layout every time till such 
time when no further cost reduction is possible. The final block layout is then printed out 
to serve as the basis for a detailed layout template of the facilities at a later stage. Since 
its formulation, more powerful versions of CRAFT have been developed but these too 
follow the same, basic heuristic routine and therefore tend to be highly CPU-intensive 
(Khalil, 1973; Hicks and Cowan, 1976). 
 
The basic computational disadvantage of a CRAFT-type technique is that one always has 
got to start with an arbitrary initial solution (Carrie, 1980). This means that there is no 
mathematical certainty of attaining the desired optimal solution after a given number of 
iterations. If the starting solution is quite close to the optimal solution by chance, then the 
final solution is attained only after a few iterations. However, as there is no guarantee that 
the starting solution will be close to the global optimum, the expected number of 
iterations required to arrive at the final solution tend to be quite large thereby straining 
computing resources (Driscoll and Sangi, 1988).  
 
 In our present paper we propose and illustrate the Modified Assignment (MASS) 
algorithm as an extension to the traditional CRAFT, to enable faster convergence to the 
optimal solution. This we propose to do by marrying CRAFT technique with the 
Hungarian assignment algorithm. As our proposed algorithm is semi-heuristic, it is likely 
to be less CPU-intensive than any traditional, purely heuristic CRAFT-type algorithm.  
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The Hungarian assignment algorithm 
 
A general assignment problem may be framed as a special case of the balanced 
transportation problem with availability and demand constraints summing up to unity. 
Mathematically, it has the following general linear programming form: 
 
                                        Minimize ΣΣ CijXij 
                                        Subject to ΣXij = 1, for each i, j = 1, 2 …n .               
 
In words, the problem may be stated as assigning each of n individuals to n jobs so that 
exactly one individual is assigned to each job in such a way as to minimize the total cost.  
 
To ensure satisfaction of the basic requirements of the assignment problem, the basic 
feasible solutions of the corresponding balanced transportation problem must be integer 
valued. However, any such basic feasible solution will contain (2n – 1) variables out of 
which (n – 1) variables will be zero thereby introducing a high level of degeneracy in the 
solution making the usual solution technique of a transportation problem very inefficient. 
 
This has resulted in mathematicians devising an alternative, more efficient algorithm for 
solving this class of problems, which has come to be commonly known as the Hungarian 
assignment algorithm. Basically, this algorithm draws from a simple theorem in linear 
algebra which says that if a constant number is added to any row and/or column of the 
cost matrix of an assignment-type problem, then the resulting assignment-type problem 
has exactly the same set of optimal solutions as the original problem and vice versa.  
 
Proof:  
 
Let Ai and Bj (i, j = 1, 2 … n) be added to the ith row and/or jth column respectively of 
the cost matrix. Then the revised cost elements are Cij* = Cij + Ai +Bj. The revised cost of 
assignment is ΣΣCij*Xij = ΣΣ (Cij + Ai + Bj) Xij = ΣΣCijXij + ΣAi ΣXij + ΣBjΣXij. But by 
the imposed assignment constraint ΣXij = 1 (for i, j = 1, 2 … n), we have the revised 
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cost as ΣΣCijXij + ΣAi + ΣBj i.e. the cost differs from the original by a constant. As the 
revised costs differ from the originals by a constant, which is independent of the decision 
variables, an optimal solution to one is also optimal solution to the other and vice versa. 
 
This theorem can be used in two different ways to solve the assignment problem. First, if 
in an assignment problem, some cost elements are negative, the problem may be 
converted into an equivalent assignment problem by adding a positive constant to each of 
the entries in the cost matrix so that they all become non-negative.  Next, the important 
thing to look for is a feasible solution that has zero assignment cost after adding suitable 
constants to the rows and columns. Since it has been assumed that all entries are now 
non-negative, this assignment must be the globally optimal one (Mustafi, 1996).  
 
Given a zero assignment, a straight line is drawn through it (a horizontal line in case of a 
row and a vertical line in case of a column), which prevents any other assignment in that 
particular row/column.  The governing algorithm then seeks to find the minimum number 
of such straight lines, which would cover all the zero entries to avoid any redundancy. 
Let us say that k such lines are required to cover all the zeroes. Then the necessary 
condition for optimality is that number of zeroes assigned is equal to k and the sufficient 
condition for optimality is that k is equal to n for an n x n cost matrix. 
  
The MASS (Modified Assignment) algorithm 
 
The basic idea of our proposed algorithm is to develop a systematic scheme to arrive at 
the initial input block layout to be fed into the CRAFT program so that the program does 
not have to start off from any initial (and possibly inefficient) solution. Thus, by 
subjecting the problem of finding an initial block layout to a mathematical scheme, we in 
effect reduce the purely heuristic algorithm of CRAFT to a semi-heuristic one. Our 
proposed MASS algorithm follows the following sequential steps: 
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Step 1: We formulate the load matrix such that each entry lij represents the load carried 
from facility i to facility j 
 
Step 2: We insert lij = M, where M is a large positive number, into all the vacant cells of 
the load matrix signifying that no inter-facility load transportation is required or possible 
between the ith and jth vacant cells  
 
Step 3: We solve the problem on the lines of a standard assignment problem using the 
Hungarian assignment algorithm treating the load matrix as the cost matrix 
 
Step 4: We draft the initial block layout trying to keep the inter-facility distance dij* 
between the ith and jth assigned facilities to the minimum possible magnitude, subject to 
the available floor area and architectural design of the shop floor 
 
Step 5: We proceed using the CRAFT program to arrive at the optimal layout by 
iteratively improving upon the starting solution provided by the Hungarian assignment 
algorithm till the overall load function L = ΣΣ lijdij* subject to any particular bounds 
imposed on the problem 
 
The Hungarian assignment algorithm will ensure that the initial block layout is at least 
very close to the global optimum if not globally optimal itself. Therefore the subsequent 
CRAFT procedure will converge on the global optimum much faster starting from this 
near-optimal initial input block layout and will be much less CPU-intensive that any 
traditional CRAFT-type algorithm. Thus MASS is not a stand-alone optimization tool but 
rather a rider on the traditional CRAFT that tries to ensure faster convergence to the 
optimal block layout for process-focused systems, by making the search semi-heuristic.  
 
We provide a numerical illustration of the MASS algorithm in the Appendix by designing 
the optimal block layout of a small, single-storied, process-focused manufacturing plant 
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with six different facilities and a rectangular shop floor design. The model can however 
be extended to cover bigger plants with more number of facilities. Also the MASS 
approach we have advocated here can even be extended to deal with the multi-floor 
version of CRAFT (Johnson, 1982) by constructing a separate assignment table for each 
floor subject to any predecessor-successor relationship among the facilities. 
 
Appendix: Numerical illustration of MASS 
 
We consider a small, single-storied process-focused manufacturing plant with a 
rectangular shop floor plan having six different facilities. We mark these facilities as FI, 
FII, FIII, FIV, FV and FVI. The architectural design requires that there be an aisle of at least 
2 meters width between two adjacent facilities and the total floor area of the plant is 64 
meters x 22 meters. Based on the different types of jobs processed, the loads to be 
transported between the different facilities are supplied in the following load matrix: 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 FI FII FIII FIV FV FVI 
FI − 20 − − − 25 
FII 10 − 15 − − − 
FIII − − − 30 − − 
FIV − − 50 − − 40 
FV − − − − − 10 
FVI − − − − 15 − 
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We put in a very large positive value M in each of the vacant cells of the load matrix to 
signify that no inter-facility transfer of load is required or is permissible for these cells: 
 
Table 2 
 
 FI FII FIII FIV FV FVI 
FI M 20 M M M 25 
FII 10 M 15 M M M 
FIII M M M 30 M M 
FIV M M 50 M M 40 
FV M M M M M 10 
FVI M M M M 15 M 
 
 
Next we apply the standard Hungarian assignment algorithm to obtain the initial solution: 
Assignment table after first iteration: 
 
Table 3 
 
 
There are two rows and three columns that are covered i.e. k = 5. But as this is a 6x6 load 
matrix, the above solution is sub-optimal. So we make a second iteration: 
 
 
 
 FI FII FIII FIV FV FVI 
FI M-20 0 M-25 M-20 M-20 5 
FII 0 M-10 0 M-10 M-10 M-10 
FIII M-30 M-30 M-35 0 M-30 M-30 
FIV M-40 M-40 5 M-40 M-40 0 
FV M-10 M-10 M-15 M-10 M-10 0 
FVI M-15 M-15 M-20 M-15 0 M-15 
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Table 4 
 
 FI FII FIII FIV FV FVI 
FI M-20 0 M-25 M-15 M-15 10 
FII 0 M-10 0 M-5 M-5 M-5 
FIII M-35 M-35 M-40 0 M-30 M-30 
FIV M-45 M-45 0 M-40 M-40 0 
FV M-15 M-15 M-20 M-10 M-10 0 
FVI M-20 M-20 M-25 M-15 0 M-15 
 
Now columns FI, FIII, FIV, FVI and rows FI and FVI are covered i.e. k = 6. As this is a 6x6 
load matrix the above solution is optimal. The optimal assignment table (subject to the 2 
meters of aisle between adjacent facilities) is shown below: 
 
Table 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 FI FII FIII FIV FV FVI 
FI − * − − − − 
FII * − − − − − 
FIII − − − * − − 
FIV − − * − − − 
FV − − − − − * 
FVI − − − − * − 
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Initial layout of facilities as dictated by the Hungarian assignment algorithm: 
 
                                Figure 2 
 
          
FI   FIII   FV 
          
          
          
          
FII   FIV   FVI 
          
 
The above layout conforms to the rectangular floor plan of the plant and also places the 
assigned facilities adjacent to each other with an aisle of 2 meters width between them. 
Thus FI is adjacent to FII, FIII is adjacent to FIV and FV is adjacent to FVI. 
 
Based on the cost information provided in the load-matrix the total cost in terms of load-
units for the above layout can be calculated as follows:   
 
L = 2{(20 + 10) + (50 + 30) + (10 + 15)} + (44 x 25) + (22 x 40) + (22 x 15) = 2580.  
 
By feeding the above optimal solution into the CRAFT program the final, the global 
optimum is found in a single iteration. The final, optimal layout as obtained by CRAFT is 
as under: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48
                                Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the cost information provided in the load-matrix the total cost in terms of load-
units for the optimal layout can be calculated as follows:   
L* = 2{(10 + 20) + (15 + 10) + (5 + 30)} + (22 x 25) + (44 x 15) + (22 x 40) = 2360. 
 
Therefore the final solution is an improvement of just 220 load-units over the initial 
solution! This shows that this initial solution fed into CRAFT is indeed near optimal and 
can thus ensure a faster convergence. 
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Abstract 
 
In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an 
application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the fuzzy 
game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in terms of 
the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier attempted 
justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir Plessner (2001) and 
go on to argue in favour of a neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum game 
theoretic model in order to identify an optimal outcome. 
 
Key Words: Israel-Palestine conflict, Oslo Agreement, fuzzy games, neutrosophic 
semantic space  
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Background 
 
There have been quite a few academic exercises to model the ongoing Israel-Palestine 
crisis using principles of statistical game theory. However, though the optimal solution is 
ideally sought in the identification of a Nash equilibrium in a cooperative game, the true 
picture is closer to a zero-sum game rather than a cooperative one. In fact it is not even a 
zero-sum game at all times, as increasing levels of mutual animosity in the minds of the 
players often pushes it closer to a sub-zero sum game. (Plessner, 2001). 
 
As was rightly pointed out by Plessner (2001), the application of game theory 
methodology to the current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is based on 
identifying the options that each party has, and an attempt to evaluate, based on the 
chosen option, what each of them is trying to achieve. The Oslo Agreement is used as an 
instance with PLO leadership being left to choose between two mutually exclusive 
options: either compliance with the agreement or non-compliance. Plessner contended 
that given the options available to PLO leadership as per the Oslo Agreement, the 
following are the five possible explanations for its conduct: 
 
• The PLO leadership acts irrationally; 
 
• Even though the PLO leadership wants peace and desires to comply, it is unable 
to do so because of mounting internal pressures; 
 
• PLO leadership wants peace but is unwilling to pay the internal political price that 
any form of compliance shall entail; 
 
• PLO leadership wants to keep the conflict going, and believes that Israel is so 
weak that it does not have to bear the internal political price of compliance, and 
can still achieve his objectives; or 
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• Given the fact that PLO leadership has been encouraging violence either overtly 
or covertly, it is merely trying to extract a better final agreement than the one 
achievable without violence 
 
Plessner (2001) further argued that the main objective of the players is not limited to 
territorial concessions but rather concerns the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty over 
Temple Mount and the right of return of Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel; within 
the territorial boundaries drawn at the time of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.  
 
However, a typical complication in a problem of this kind is that neither the principal 
objective nor the strategy vectors remain temporally static. That is, the players’ goals and 
strategies change over time making the payoff matrix a dynamic one. So, the same 
players under a similar set-up are sometimes found engaging in cooperative games and at 
other times in non-cooperative ones purely depending on their governing strategy vectors 
and principal objective at any particular point of time. For example, the PLO leadership 
may have bargained for a better final agreement using pressure tactics based on violence 
in the pre 9/11 scenario when the world had not yet woken up fully to the horrors of 
global terrorism and he perceived that the Israel was more likely to make territorial 
concessions in exchange of lasting peace. However, in the post 9/11 scenario, with the 
global opinion strongly united against any form of terrorism, its governing strategy vector 
will have to change as Israel now not only will stone-wall the pressure tactics, but will 
also enjoy more liberty to go on the offensive.   
 
Moreover, besides being temporally unstable, the objectives and strategies are often ill-
defined, inconsistent and have a lot of interpretational ambiguity. For example, while a 
strategy for the PLO leadership could appear to be keeping the conflict alive with the 
covert objective of maintaining its own organizational significance in the Arabian 
geopolitics, at the same time there would definitely have to be some actions from its side 
which would convey a clear message to the other side that it wants to end the conflict – 
which apparently has been its overt objective, which would then get Israel to reciprocate 
its overt intentions. But in doing so, Israel could gain an upper hand at the bargaining 
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table, which would again cause internal pressures to mount on PLO leadership thereby 
jeopardizing the very position of power it is seen trying to preserve by keeping the 
conflict alive.  
 
 
The problem modelled as a standard 2x2 zero-sum game 
 
                                                               Palestine 
                                               I                                        II 
                       
                    I  
 Israel         II 
                    III 
                    IV 
 
 
Palestine’s strategy vector: (I – full compliance with Oslo Agreement, II – partial or non-
compliance) 
 
Israel’s strategy vector: (I - make territorial concessions, II - accept right of return of the 
Palestinian refugees, III – launch an all-out military campaign, IV – continue stone-
walling) 
 
The payoff matrix has been constructed with reference to the row player i.e. Israel. In 
formulating the payoff matrix it is assumed that combination (I, I) will potentially end the 
conflict while combination (IV, II) will basically mean a status quo with continuing 
conflict. If Palestine can get Israel to either make territorial concessions or accept the 
right of return of Palestinian refugees without fully complying with the Oslo Agreement 
i.e. strategy combinations (I, II) and (II, II), then it marks a gain for the former and a loss 
for the latter. If Israel accepts the right of return of Palestinian refugees and Palestine 
agrees to fully comply with the Oslo Agreement, then though it would potentially end the 
1 -1 
0 -1 
0 -1 
1  0 
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conflict, it could possibly be putting the idea of an independent Jewish state into jeopardy 
and so the strategy combination (II, I) does not have a positive payoff for Israel. If Israel 
launches an all-out military campaign and forces Palestine into complying with the Oslo 
Agreement i.e. strategy combination (III, I) then it would not result in an exactly positive 
payoff for Israel due to possible alienation of world opinion and may be even losing some 
of the U. S. backing. If an all-out Israeli military aggression causes a hardening of stance 
by Palestine then it will definitely result in a negative payoff due to increased violence 
and bloodshed. If however, there is a sudden change of heart within the Palestinian 
leadership and Palestine chooses to fully abide by the Oslo Agreement without any 
significant corresponding territorial or political consideration by Israel i.e. strategy 
combination (IV, I), it will result in a potential end to the conflict with a positive payoff 
for Israel. 
 
In the payoff matrix, the last row dominates the first three rows while the second column 
dominates the first column. Therefore the above game has a saddle point for the strategy 
combination (IV, II) which shows that in their attempt to out-bargain each other both 
parties will actually end up continuing the conflict indefinitely!  
 
It is clear that Palestine on its part will not want to ever agree to have full compliance 
with the Oslo Agreement as it will see always see itself worse off that way. Given that 
Palestine will never actually comply fully with the Oslo Agreement, Israel will see in its 
best interest to continue the status quo with an ongoing conflict, as it will see itself 
ending up on the worse end of the bargain if it chooses to play any other strategy.  
 
The equilibrium solution as we have obtained here is more or less in concurrence with the 
conclusion reached by Plessner. He argued that given the existing information at Israel's 
disposal, it is impossible to tell whether PLO leadership chooses non-compliance because 
it will have to pay a high internal political price otherwise or because it may want to keep 
the conflict alive just to wear down the other side thereby opening up the possibility of 
securing greater bargaining power at the negotiating table. The point Plessner sought to 
make is that whether or not PLO leadership truly wants peace is immaterial because in 
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any case it will act in order to postpone a final agreement, increase its weight in the 
international political arena and also try to gain further concessions from Israel. 
 
 
Case for applying neutrosophic game theory 
 
However, as is quite evident, none of the strategy vectors available to either side will 
remain temporally stationary as crucial events keep unfolding on the global political stage 
in general and the Middle-Eastern political stage in particular. Moreover, there is a lot of 
ambiguity about the driving motives behind PLO leadership’s primary goal and the 
strategies it adopts to achieve that goal. Also it is hard to tell apart a true bargaining 
strategy from one just meant to be a political decoy. This is where we believe and 
advocate an application of the conceptual framework of the neutrosophic game theory as 
a generalization of the dynamic fuzzy game paradigm. 
 
 In generalized terms, a well-specified dynamic game at time t is a particular interaction 
ensemble with well defined rules and roles for the players within the ensemble, which 
remain in place at time t but are allowed to change over time. However, the players often 
may suffer from what is termed in organizational psychology as “role ambiguity” i.e. a 
situation where none of the players are exactly sure what to expect from the others or 
what the other players expect from them. In the context of the Israel-Palestine problem, 
for example, PLO leadership would probably not have been sure of its exact role when 
Yasser Arafat met with U.S. and Israeli leadership at the Camp David Summit ostensibly 
to hammer out a peace agreement. Again following Plessner’s argument, Arafat went to 
that Summit against his free will and would have liked to avoid Camp David if he could 
because he did not want to sign any final agreement that was short of a complete 
renunciation of its sovereign existence by Israel. With no such capitulation forthcoming 
from Israel, it was in PLO leadership’s best interest to keep the conflict alive. However, it 
did have to give certain overt indications mainly to keep U.S. satisfied that a negotiated 
settlement was possible and was being preferred over letting loose Hamas mercenaries on 
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the streets.   Under such circumstances, it would be quite impossible to pick out a distinct 
governing strategy which the other side could then meet with a counter-strategy.  
 
However, one positive aspect about Summits such as the Camp David Summit is that 
they make the game scenario an open one in the sense that the conflicting parties are able 
to dynamically construct and formulate objectives and strategies in the course of their 
peaceful, mutual interaction within a formally defined socio-political set-up. This allows 
a closer analytical study of the negotiation process where the negotiation space may be 
defined as NPalestine ∩ NIsrael. 
 
There is a fuzzy semantic space which is a collective of each player’s personal views 
about what constitutes a “just deal” (Burns and Rowzkowska, 2002). Such views are 
formed based on personal value judgments, past experience and also an expectation about 
the possible best-case and worst-case negotiation outcomes. This fuzzy semantic space is 
open to modifications as negotiations progress and views are exchanged resulting in 
earlier notions being updated in the light of new information.  
 
This semantic space however remains fuzzy due to vagueness about the exact objectives 
and lack of precise understanding of the exact stakes which the opposing parties have 
from their viewpoints. That is to say, none of the conflicting parties can effectively put 
themselves in the shoes of each other and precisely understand each other’s nature of 
expectations.  
 
This is borne out in the Camp David Summit when probably one side of the table was 
thinking in terms of keeping the conflict alive while giving the impression to the other 
side that they were seriously seeking ways to end it. This immediately makes it clear why 
such a negotiation would break down, simply because it never got started in the first 
place! 
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If the Israel-Palestine problem is formulated as a dynamic fuzzy bargaining game, the 
players’ fuzzy set judgement functions over expected outcomes may be formulated as 
follows according to the well known rules of fuzzy set algebra (Zadeh, 1965): 
 
For Palestine, the fuzzy evaluative judgment function at time t, J (P, t) will be given by 
the fuzzy set membership function M J (P, t) which is expressed as follows: 
 
                                                               c∈ (0.5, 1); for ℘Worst < x < ℘Best 
                                                              M J (P, t) (x) =    0.5; for x = ℘Worst; and 
                                                               0; for x ≤℘Worst 
 
Here ℘Best is the best possible negotiation outcome Palestine could expect; which, 
according to Plessner, would probably be Israeli recognition of the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees to their pre-1967 domicile status.For Israel on the other hand, the 
fuzzy evaluative judgment function at time t, J (I, t) will be given by the fuzzy set 
membership function M J (I, t) which will be as follows: 
                                                                            
                                                               1; for y ≥ℑBest 
                                                                c΄∈ (0.5, 1); for ℑWorst < y < ℑBest 
                                        M J (I, t) (y) =    0.5; for y = ℑWorst; 
                                                                0; for y ≤ ℑWorst 
 
Here ℑWorst is the worst possible negotiation outcome Israel could expect; which, would 
concur with the best expected outcome for Palestine.  
 
However, the semantic space NPalestine ∩ NIsrael is more generally framed as a neutrosophic 
semantic space which is a three-way generalization of the fuzzy semantic space and 
includes a third, neutral possibility whereby the semantic space cannot be de-fuzzified 
into two crisp zero-one states due to the incorporation of an intervening state of 
“indeterminacy”. Such indeterminacy could practically arise from the fact that any 
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mediated, two-way negotiation process is likely to become over-catalyzed by the 
subjective utility preferences of the mediator – in case of the Israel-Palestine problem; 
that of the U.S. (and to a lesser extent; that of some of the other permanent members of 
the UN Security Council).  
 
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that is concerned with neutralities and their 
interaction with various ideational spectra (Smarandache, 2000). Let T, I, F be real 
subsets of the non-standard interval ]-0, 1+[. If ∈ > 0 is an infinitesimal such that for all 
positive integers n and we have |∈| < 1/n, then the non-standard finite numbers 1+ = 1+∈ 
and 0- = 0-∈ form the boundaries of the non-standard interval ]-0, 1+[. Statically, T, I, F 
are subsets while dynamically, as in our case when we are using the model in the context 
of a dynamic game, they may be viewed as set-valued vector functions. If a logical 
proposition is said to be t% true in T, i% indeterminate in I and f% false in F then T, I, F 
are referred to as the neutrosophic components. Neutrosophic probability is useful to 
events that are shrouded in a veil of indeterminacy like the actualimplied volatility of 
long-term options. As this approach uses a subset-approximation for truth values, 
indeterminacy and falsity-values it provides a better approximation than classical 
probability to uncertain events. 
 
Therefore, for Palestine, the neutrosophic evaluative judgment function at time t, JN (P, t) 
will be given by the neutrosophic set membership function M JN (P, t) which may be 
expressed as follows: 
 
                                                              c∈ (0.5, 1); for ℘Worst < x < ℘Best AND x ∈ T 
                                                             M JN (P, t) (x) =  0.5; for x = ℘Worst AND x ∈ T 
                                                              0; for x ≤℘Worst AND x ∈ T 
 
For Israel on the other hand, the neutrosophic evaluative judgment function at time t, JN 
(I, t) will be given by the neutrosophic set membership function M JN (I, t) which may be 
expressed as follows: 
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                                                              1; for y ≥ℑBest AND y ∈ F 
                                                              c΄∈ (0.5, 1); for ℑWorst < y < ℑBest AND y ∈ F 
                                                             M JN (I, t) (y) =  0.5; for y = ℑWorst AND y ∈ F; 
                                                              0; for y ≤ ℑWorst AND y ∈ F 
 
Pertaining to the three-way classification of neutrosophic semantic space, it is t% true in 
sub-space T that a mediated, bilateral negotiation will produce a favorable outcome 
within the evaluative judgment space of the Palestinian leadership while it is f% false in 
sub-space F that the outcome will be favorable within the evaluative judgment space of 
the Palestinian leadership.  However there is an i% indeterminacy in sub-space I whereby 
the nature of the outcome may be neither favorable nor unfavorable within the evaluative 
judgment space of either competitor – for example if the negotiation process is over-
catalyzed by the utility preferences of the mediator! 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
M JN (P, t) (x) {or M JN (I, t) (y)} would be interpreted as Palestine’s (or Israel’s) degree of 
satisfaction with the negotiated settlement. Following Plessner’s argument again, it is 
PLO leadership’s ultimate objective to see the end of an independent Jewish state of 
Israel and if that be the case then of course there will always be an unbridgeable 
incongruence between M JN (P, t) (x) and M JN (I, t) (y) because of mutually inconsistent 
evaluative judgment spaces between the two parties to the conflict. Therefore, for any 
form of negotiation to have a positive result the first and foremost requirement would be 
to make the evaluative judgment spaces consistent. Because unless the evaluative 
judgment spaces are consistent, the negotiation space will degenerate into a null set at the 
very onset of the bargaining process thereby pre-empting any equilibrium solution 
different from the status quo. However, by its very definition, since these spaces are not 
crisp, they are malleable to some extent (Reiter, 1980). That is, even while retaining their 
core forms, subtle changes could be induced to make these spaces workably consistent. 
Then the aim of the mediator should to make the parties redefine their primary objectives 
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without necessarily feeling that such redefinition itself means a concession. When this 
required redefinition of primary objectives has been achieved can the evaluative 
judgment spaces generate a negotiation space that will not become null ab initio. 
However, there is also an indeterminate aspect to any process of mediated bilateral 
dialogues between the two parties due to the catalyzation effect brought about by the 
subjective utility preferences of the mediator (or mediators).  
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Abstract 
 
In this short, technical paper we have sought to derive, under a posited formal model of 
political equilibrium, an expression for the effective number of political parties (ENP) 
that can contest elections in a multi-party democracy having a plurality voting 
system(also known as a first-past-the-post voting system). We have postulated a formal 
definition of political equilibrium borrowed from the financial market equilibrium 
whereby given the set of utility preferences of all eligible voters as well as of all the 
candidates, each and every candidate in an electoral fray stands the same objective 
chance of getting elected. Using an expected information paradigm, we show that under a 
condition of political equilibrium, the effective number of political parties is given by the 
reciprocal of the proportion of core electorate (non-floating voters). We have further 
argued that the formulated index agrees with a party system predicted by Duverger’s law.  
 
Key words: Plurality voting, entropic equilibrium, floating voters, Duverger’s law 
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Introduction 
 
Plurality voting systems are currently used in over forty countries worldwide which 
include some of the largest democracies like USA, Canada, India and UK. Under the 
basic plurality voting system, a country is divided into territorial single-member 
constituencies; voters within each constituency cast a single ballot (typically marked by a 
X) for one candidate; and the candidate with the largest share of votes in each seat is 
returned to office; and the political party (or a confederation of ideologically similar 
political parties) with an overall majority of seats forms the government. The 
fundamental feature of the plurality voting system is that single-member constituencies 
are based on the size of the electorate. For example, the US is divided into 435 
Congressional districts each including roughly equal populations with one House 
representative per district. Boundaries of constituencies are reviewed at periodic intervals 
based on the national census to maintain the electorate balance. However the number of 
voters per constituency varies dramatically across countries e.g. India has 545 
representatives for a population of over nine hundred million, so each member of the Lok 
Sabha (House of the People) serves nearly two million people, while in contrast Ireland 
has 166 members in the Dial for a population slightly more than three-and-half million or 
approximately one seat for a little over twenty thousand people. 
 
Under the first-past-the-post voting system candidates only need a simple plurality i.e. at 
least one more vote than their closest rival to get elected. Hence in three-way electoral 
contests, the winning candidate can theoretically have less than fifty percent of votes cast 
in his or her favor e.g. if the vote shares are 35%, 34% and 31%, the candidate with a 
35% vote share will get elected. Therefore, although two-thirds of voters support other 
candidates, the candidate with a simple plurality of votes wins the contest (Norris, 1997).  
 
We define political equilibrium as a condition in which the choices of voters and political 
parties are all compatible and in which no one group can improve its position by making 
a different choice. In essence therefore, political equilibrium may be said to exist when, 
given the set of utility preferences of all eligible voters as well as of all the candidates, 
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each and every candidate in an electoral fray stands the same chance of getting elected. 
This definition is adequately broad to cover more specific conditional equilibrium models 
and is based on the principle of efficiency as applied to financial markets. Daniel Sutter 
(2002) defines political equilibrium as “a balance between demands by citizens on the 
political system and candidates compete for office”. Therefore, translated to a multi-party 
democracy having a plurality voting system, political equilibrium can be thought to imply 
a state where perfect balance of power exists between all contesting parties. 
Methodologically, we build our formal equilibrium model using an expected information 
approach used in a generalized financial market equilibrium model (Bhattacharya, 2001). 
 
 
Computing an effective number of political parties 
 
Is there a unique optimum for the number of political parties that have to compete in 
order to ensure a political equilibrium? If there indeed is such an optimal number then 
this number necessarily has to be central to any theoretical formalization of political 
equilibrium as we have defined. Rae (1967) advanced the first formal expression for 
political fractionalization in a multi-party democracy as follows:  
 
Fs = 1–3(si)2 
 
Here Fs is known as Rae’s index of political fractionalization and si is the proportion of 
seats of the ith political party in the Parliament. Conceptually, Rae’s fractionalization 
index is adapted from the Herfindahl-Hirschman market power concentration index. F is 
0 for a single-party system and F tends to 0.50 for a two-party system in equilibrium i.e. 
when both parties command same proportion of seats in the Parliament. Of course F 
asymptotically approaches unity as the party system becomes more and more 
fractionalized. Of course, one may adapt Rae’s fractionalization index in terms of the 
proportion of votes secured in an election instead of seats in Parliament. In that case 
Rae’s index of fractionalization may be represented as follows: 
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Fv = 1–3(vi)2 
 
Dumont and Caulier (2003) have recognized two major drawbacks of Rae’s index. 
Firstly, the index is not linear for parties that are tied in strength; measured either as 
proportion of seats or proportion of votes. A two-party system in equilibrium produces an 
F of 0.50 whereas a four-party system in equilibrium produces 0.75 and a five-party 
system in equilibrium will have an F of 0.80. Dumont and Caulier (2003) point out that 
this feature makes the F untenable as an index as the operationalized measure and the 
phenomenon it measures follow different progression paths.  Secondly, Rae’s index is, 
like most other normalized indices of social phenomena, extremely difficult to interpret 
in objective terms as a unique variable characterizing a party system.  The effective 
number of parties (ENP) measure formulated by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) by 
improving on Rae’s index is now commonly regarded as the classical numerical measure 
for the comparative analysis of party systems. This ENP formula takes both the number 
of parties and their relative weights into account when computing a unique variable 
characterizing a party system thereby making objective interpretation a lot easier as 
compared to Rae’s fractionalization index.  The ENP formula is simply stated as the 
reciprocal of the complement of Rae’s fractionalization index i.e. 
 
ENPs= (1 – Fs)-1 and ENPv = (1 – Fv)-1 
 
In equilibrium, all political parties will command the same strength measured either as 
proportion of seats or votes and ENP will exactly equal the number of parties in fray. 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) have argued that the ENP has become a widely-used index 
because it “usually tends to agree with our average intuition about the number of serious 
parties”. However Molinar (1991) and Dunleavy and Boucek (2003) have argued that this 
index produces counter-intuitive and counter-empirical results under a number of 
circumstances. Taagepera (1999) himself suggested that in cases where one party clearly 
dominates the political system (commanding more than 50% of the seats), an additional 
index called the LC (Largest Component) index should be used in conjunction with ENP. 
The LC is simply the reciprocal of the share of the largest party. When LC is greater than 
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2 for any party, that party clearly dominates the political system which would however be 
classified as a multi-party system if only the ENP was the sole classification criterion.  
Dunleavy and Boucek (2003) have advocated the averaging of ENP index with the LC 
index to yield a unique classification criterion. Dumont and Caulier (2003) advanced the 
effective number of relevant parties measure (ENRP) as an improvement over the ENP in 
a way that their measure yields a unique classification criterion that roughly corresponds 
to the ENP measure when there are more than two parties that can be considered as major 
contenders for victory in an electoral contest and collapses to unity if there are only one 
or two parties that can be seriously considered as a potential winner.  
 
Irrespective of which variant of the ENP index we consider, it is obvious that an intuitive 
paradigm formalizing political equilibrium in a multi-party democracy having a plurality 
voting system may be constructed if it can be shown that in equilibrium, all parties in fray 
are indeed expected to command an equal strength measured either in terms of seats or 
votes. But such formalization would be considered somewhat limited if it did not take 
into account the impact of floating voters on electoral outcomes. These are the 
quintessential fence-sitters who waver between parties during the course of a Parliament, 
or who don’t make up their minds until very close to the election (or even until actually 
putting their stamps on the ballot paper). The impact of floating voters on electoral 
outcome is all the more an important issue for large-sized electorates as is the case for 
very populous countries like India.  But none of the ENP indices consider floating voters. 
 
Effective number of political parties with floating voters in entropic equilibrium 
Considering a finite fraction of floating voters in any electorate, we may define the 
following relationship as the (conservative) expected vote share of the ith political party: 
 
E(Vi) = [E(Si)](1 –λi) 
 
Here E(Si) is the ith candidate’s expected vote share as a proportion of the total electorate 
size and λi is the fraction of the ith candidate’s vote share that is deemed to come from 
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floating voters. This is the fraction of electorate which is generally supportive of the ith 
candidate but this support may or may not be translated into actual votes on the day of the 
election. Thus E(Si) is the expected proportion of votes to be cast in the ith candidate’s 
favor accepting the existence of floating voters in the electorate. Therefore we may write: 
 
3i E(Vi) = 3i [E(Si)](1 –λi) 
 
Let us denote 3i E(Vi) as E(V) and 3i E(Si) as E(S). Therefore, re-arranging (5) we get:  
 
3i [E(Si)] λi = E(S) – E(V) 
 
In mathematical information theory, entropy or expected information from an event is 
measured using a logarithmic function borrowed from classical thermodynamics. There 
are two possible mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes for any individual event –
either the event occurs or the event does not occur. If there are m candidates in an 
electoral fray the two events associated with each candidate in fray is that either the 
particular candidate wins the election or he/she does not win. If pi is the probability of the 
ith candidate winning the election, then the expected information content of a message 
that conveys the outcome of an election with i = 1, 2, …, m candidates is obtained by the 
classical entropy function as formulated by Shannon (1948) as follows: 
 
ψ(p) = (–C′)3i(pi)log2(pi) 
 
Here C′ is a positive scale factor (a negentropic counterpart of the Boltzmann constant in 
thermodynamic entropy). Under an m-party political equilibrium, the long run core (non-
floating) vote shares of the i = 1, 2, …, m candidates in electoral fray may be considered 
as equivalent to their long run winning probabilities. Thus ψ(p) is re-writable as follows:  
 
ψ(1 –λ) = (–C′)3i(1 – λi)log2(1 – λi) 
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Proposition: If ψ(1 – λ) is the expected information from the knowledge of an electoral 
outcome given the proportion of non-floating voters (1 –λi) in the vote share of the ith 
candidate, then the effective number of parties under entropic equilibrium is given as: 
 
ENP(λ) = (1 – λ*)–1; where λ* = 1 –E(V)/E(S) 
 
Proof: Incorporating the Lagrangian multiplier L the objective function can be written as: 
 
Z (1 – λi, L) = (–C′) 3i(1 – λi) log2 (1 – λi) + L{1 –3i(1 – λi)} 
 
Taking partial derivative of Z with respect to (1 –λi) and setting equal to zero as per the 
necessary condition of maximization, the following stationary condition is obtained: 
 
∂Z/∂(1 – λi) = (–C′){log2(1 – λi) + 1} –L = 0 
 
Therefore at the point of maximum entropy one gets log2(1 – λi) = – (L/C′+ 1) i.e. (1 λi) 
becomes a constant value independent of i for all i = 1, 2, …, m candidates in the 
electoral contest. Since necessarily the 1 – λi values must sum to unity, it implies that at 
the point of maximum entropy we must have p1 = p2 =… = pm = (1 – λ*) = 1/m.                                           
 
Therefore m ≡ ENP(λ) = (1 – λ*)–1 
 
Simplifying the expression for 3i[E(Si)]λi = E(S) – E(V) under equilibrium we may 
write:                                            
 
λ*E(S) = E(S) – E(V) i.e. λ* = 1 –E(V)/E(S)                      Q.E.D. 
 
λ* is simply the total percentage of floating voters under an entropic political 
equilibrium1. Thus ENP(λ) is formally obtained (as expected intuitively) as the reciprocal 
of the equilibrium percentage of non-floating voters in the electorate. The higher the 
proportion of floating voters within the electorate, the higher is the value of ENP(λ). The 
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intuitive reasoning is obvious – with a large number of floating votes to go around, more 
candidates could stay in the electoral fray than there would be if the electorate consisted 
of only a very small percentage of floating voters. When λ = 50%, ENP(λ) = 2. If λ goes 
up to 75%, ENP(λ) will go up to 4 i.e. with 25% more floating voters within the 
electorate, 2 more candidates can stay in electoral fray feeding off the floating votes.  
Thus ENP(λ) (the formula for which is structurally quite similar to Laakso and 
Taagepera’s ENP index) is a generalized measure of ENP based on the entropic 
formalization of political equilibrium accepting the very real existence of floating voters.  
 
 
Entropic political equilibrium and Duverger’s law 
 
Duverger (1951) stated that the electoral contest in a single-seat electoral constituency 
following a plurality voting system tends to converge to a two-party system. Duverger’s 
law basically stems from the premise of strategic voting. Palfrey (1989) has showed that 
in large electorates, equilibrium voting behavior implies that a voter will always vote for 
the most preferred candidate of the two frontrunners. For a given electorate of size n, 
Palfrey’s model is stated in terms of the following inequality: 
 
uk > uj [(3i≠j(pnij/pnkl) / (3h≠k(pnkh/pnkl)] + 3i≠j,k ui [{(pnki– pnij)/pnkl}/3h≠k(pnkh/pnkl)]         
 
In this model, uk denotes the voter’s utility of his/her first choice among the two 
frontrunners and ul denotes the voter’s utility for his/her second choice among the 
frontrunners so that uk > ul. Also j is any other candidate from among the i = 1, 2, …, m 
candidates. The notation pnij stands for the probability that the candidate i and candidate j 
are tied for the most votes and the interpretation is similar for notations pnkh and pnkl. In 
the limiting case, the likelihood ratio pnkh/pnkl tends to zero for all ij ≠ kl. Thus the right-
hand side of the inequality converges to ul irrespective of j; thereby mathematically 
establishing Duverger’s law.  Apart from Palfrey’s theoretical formalization, Cox and     
Amorem Neto (1997) and Benoit (1998) and Schneider (2004) have provided empirical 
evidence generally supportive of Duverger’s law.  
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It therefore seems rather appropriate that an intuitive model of political equilibrium in a 
multi-party democracy that follows a plurality voting system should at least take 
Duverger’s law into consideration if not actually have it embedded in some form within 
its formal structure.  This is true for our entropic model, because as m increases (1 –λ*) = 
1/m becomes smaller and smaller, thereby implying that for multi-party democracies that 
follow a plurality voting system, the political equilibrium most likely to prevail in the 
long run will tend to occur at the highest possible value of (1 –λ*) = 50%.  In other 
words, although some relatively new democracies may start off with a number of political 
parties contesting elections and a very large percentage of floating voters in the 
electorate, the likelihood is very low that a very high proportion (exceeding 50%) of the    
electorate will be composed of floating voters in the long run which implies that in the 
long run, “mature” multi-party democracies having plurality voting systems will tend to 
have only two parties as serious contenders for victory in an election; corresponding to a 
two-party system as stated by Duverger’s law.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have proposed and mathematically derived a formula for the effective number of 
political parties that can be in electoral fray under a condition of political equilibrium in a 
multi-party democracy following a plurality voting system. We have posited the expected        
information approach to formalize the concept of political equilibrium in a parliamentary 
democracy. Our advocated model aims to improve upon existing ENP indices by 
incorporating the very realistic consideration of the impact of floating voters on elections. 
Of course, ours has been an entirely theoretical exercise and a potentially rewarding 
direction of future research would be to empirically investigate the veracity of ENP(λ) 
possibly in conjunction with a suitable classification model to distinguish floating voters. 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present an application of the neutrosophic logic in the prediction of the 
financial markets. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The efficient market hypothesis based primarily on the statistical principle of Bayesian 
inference has been proved to be only a special-case scenario. The generalized financial 
market, modeled as a binary, stochastic system capable of attaining one of two possible 
states (High → 1, Low → 0) with finite probabilities, is shown to reach efficient 
equilibrium with p . M = p if and only if the transition probability matrix M2x2 obeys the 
additionally imposed condition {m11 = m22, m12 = m21}, where mij is an element of M 
(Bhattacharya, 2001).  [1] 
 Efficient equilibrium is defined as the stationery condition p = [0.50, 0.50] i.e. the state 
in t + 1 is equi-probable between the two possible states given the market vector in time t. 
However, if this restriction {m11 = m22, m12 = m21} is removed, we get inefficient 
equilibrium ρ = [m21/(1-v), m12/(1-v)], where v = m11 – m21 may be derived as the 
eigenvalue of M and ρ is a generalized version of p whereby the elements of the market 
vector are no longer restricted to their efficient equilibrium values. Though this proves 
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that the generalized financial market cannot possibly get reduced to pure random walk if 
we do away with the assumption of normality, it does not necessarily rule out the 
possibility of mean reversion as M itself undergoes transition over time implying a 
probable re-establishment of the condition {m11 = m22, m12 = m21} at some point of time 
in the foreseeable future. The temporal drift rate may be viewed as the mean reversion 
parameter k such that kjMt → Mt+j.  In particular, the options market demonstrates a 
rather perplexing departure from efficiency. In a Black-Scholes type world, if stock price 
volatility is known a priori, the option prices are completely determined and any 
deviations are quickly arbitraged away. 
 Therefore, statistically significant mispricings in the options market are somewhat 
unique as the only non-deterministic variable in option pricing theory is volatility. 
Moreover, given the knowledge of implied volatility on the short-term options, the 
miscalibration in implied volatility on the longer term options seem odd as the parameters 
of the process driving volatility over time can simply be estimated by an AR1 model 
(Stein, 1993). [2] 
 Clearly, the process is not quite as straightforward as a simple parameter estimation 
routine from an autoregressive process. Something does seem to affect the market 
players’ collective pricing of longer term options, which clearly overshadows the 
straightforward considerations of implied volatility on the short-term options. One clear 
reason for inefficiencies to exist is through overreaction of the market players to new 
information. Some inefficiency however may also be attributed to purely random white 
noise unrelated to any coherent market information. If the process driving volatility is 
indeed mean reverting then a low implied volatility on an option with a shorter time to 
expiration will be indicative of a higher implied volatility on an option with a longer time 
to expiration. Again, a high implied volatility on an option with a shorter time to 
expiration will be indicative of a lower implied volatility on an option with a longer time 
to expiration. However statistical evidence often contradicts this rational expectations 
hypothesis for the implied volatility term structure.  
  Denoted by σ’t (t), (where the symbol ’ indicates first derivative) the implied volatility 
at time t of an option expiring at time T is given in a Black-Scholes type world as 
follows: 
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         σ’t (t) = j=0∫T [{σM + kj (σt - σM)}/T] dj 
         σ’t (t) = σM + (kT – 1)(σt - σM)/(T ln k)       (1) 
 
Here σt evolves according to a continuous-time, first-order Wiener process as follows: 
 
         dσt = - β0 (σt - σM) dt + β1σt ε√dt               (2)                                                      
 
 β0 = - ln k, where k is the mean reversion parameter. Viewing this as a mean reverting 
AR1 process yields the expectation at time t, Et (σt+j), of the instantaneous volatility at 
time t+j, in the required form as it appears under the integral sign in equation (1). 
 This theorizes that volatility is rationally expected to gravitate geometrically back 
towards its long-term mean level of σM. That is, when instantaneous volatility is above its 
mean level (σt > σM), the implied volatility on an option should be decreasing as t → T. 
Again, when instantaneous volatility is below the long-term mean, it should be rationally 
expected to be increasing as t → T. That this theorization does not satisfactorily reflect 
reality is attributable to some kind combined effect of overreaction of the market players 
to excursions in implied volatility of short-term options and their corresponding 
underreaction to the historical propensity of these excursions to be rather short-lived. 
 
2. A Cognitive Dissonance Model of Behavioral Market Dynamics 
 
 Whenever a group of people starts acting in unison guided by their hearts rather than 
their heads, two things are seen to happen. Their individual suggestibilities decrease 
rapidly while the suggestibility of the group as a whole increases even more rapidly. The 
‘leader’, who may be no more than just the most vociferous agitator, then primarily 
shapes the groupthink. He ultimately becomes the focus of the group opinion. In any 
financial market, it is the gurus and the experts who often play this role. The crowd hangs 
on their every word and makes them the uncontested Oracles of the marketplace.  
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 If figures and formulae continue to speak against the prevailing groupthink, this could 
result into a mass cognitive dissonance calling for reinforcing self-rationalizations to be 
strenuously developed to suppress this dissonance. As individual suggestibilities are at a 
lower level compared to the group suggestibility, these self-rationalizations can actually 
further fuel the prevailing groupthink. This groupthink can even crystallize into 
something stronger if there is also a simultaneous vigilance depression effect caused by a 
tendency to filter out the dissonance-causing information. The non-linear feedback 
process keeps blowing up the bubble until a critical point is reached and the bubble bursts 
ending the prevailing groupthink with a recalibration of the position by the experts. 
 Our proposed model has two distinct components – a linear feedback process containing 
no looping and a non-linear feedback process fuelled by an unstable rationalization loop. 
It is due to this loop that perceived true value of an option might be pushed away from its 
theoretical true value. The market price of an option will follow its perceived true value 
rather than its theoretical true value and hence the inefficiencies arise. This does not 
mean that the market as a whole has to be inefficient – the market can very well be close 
to strong efficiency! Only it is the perceived true value that determines the actual price-
path meaning that all market information (as well as some of the random white noise) 
gets automatically anchored to this perceived true value. This would also explain why 
excursions in short-term implied volatilities tend to dominate the historical considerations 
of mean reversion – the perceived term structure simply becomes anchored to the 
prevailing groupthink about the nature of the implied volatility. 
 Our conceptual model is based on two primary assumptions: 
 
The unstable rationalization loop comes into effect if and only if the group is a 
reasonably well-bonded one i.e. if the initial group suggestibility has already attained a 
certain minimum level as, for example, in cases of strong cartel formations and; 
 
The   unstable rationalization loop stays in force till some critical point in time t* is 
reached in the life of the option.  Obviously t* will tend to be quite close to T – the time 
of expiration. At that critical point any further divergence becomes unsustainable due to 
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the extreme pressure exerted by real economic forces ‘gone out of sync’ and the gap 
between perceived and theoretical true values close very rapidly.             
2.1. The Classical Cognitive Dissonance Paradigm 
 
 Since Leon Festinger presented it well over four decades ago, cognitive dissonance 
theory has continued to generate a lot of interest as well as controversy. [3] [4] This was 
mainly due to the fact that the theory was originally stated in very generalized, abstract 
terms. As a consequence, it presented possible areas of application covering a number of 
psychological issues involving the interaction of cognitive, motivational, and emotional 
factors. Festinger’s dissonance theory began by postulating that pairs of cognitions 
(elements of knowledge), given that they are relevant to one another, can either be in 
agreement with each other or otherwise. If they are in agreement they are said to be 
consonant, otherwise they are termed dissonant. The mental condition that forms out of a 
pair of dissonant cognitions is what Festinger calls cognitive dissonance.  
 The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, motivates the person 
to reduce the dissonance by a process of filtering out information that are likely to 
increase the dissonance. The greater the degree of the dissonance, the greater is the 
pressure to reduce dissonance and change a particular cognition.  The likelihood that a 
particular cognition will change is determined by the resistance to change of the 
cognition. Again, resistance to change is based on the responsiveness of the cognition to 
reality and on the extent to which the particular cognition is in line with various other 
cognitions. Resistance to change of cognition depends on the extent of loss or suffering 
that must be endured and the satisfaction or pleasure obtained from the behavior. [5] [6] 
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
 We propose the conjecture that cognitive dissonance is one possible (indeed highly 
likely) critical behavioral trigger [13] that sets off the rationalization loop and 
subsequently feeds it.  
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 2.2 Non-linear Feedback Statistics Generating a Rationalization Loop  
 
 In a linear autoregressive model of order R, a time series yn is modeled as a linear 
combination of N earlier values in the time series, with an added correction term xn:  
 
                         yn = xn - Σaj yn-j                                            (3) 
 
 The autoregressive coefficients aj (j = 1, ... N) are fitted by minimizing the mean-squared 
difference between the modeled time series yn and the observed time series yn. The 
minimization process results in a system of linear equations for the coefficients an, known 
as the Yule-Walker equations. Conceptually, the time series yn is considered to be the 
output of a discrete linear feedback circuit driven by a noise xn, in which delay loops of 
lag j have feedback strength aj. For Gaussian signals, an autoregressive model often 
provides a concise description of the time series yn, and calculation of the coefficients aj 
provides an indirect but highly efficient method of spectral estimation. In a full nonlinear 
autoregressive model, quadratic (or higher-order) terms are added to the linear 
autoregressive model. A constant term is also added, to counteract any net offset due to 
the quadratic terms: 
 
        yn = xn - a0 - Σaj yn-j - Σbj, k yn-jyn-k                      (4) 
 
 The autoregressive coefficients aj (j = 0, ... N) and bj, k (j, k = 1, ... N) are fit by 
minimizing the mean-squared difference between the modeled time series yn and the 
observed time series yn*. The minimization process also results in a system of linear 
equations, which are generalizations of the Yule-Walker equations for the linear 
autoregressive model.   
 Conceptually, the time series yn is considered to be the output of a circuit with nonlinear 
feedback, driven by a noise xn. In principle, the coefficients bj, k describes dynamical 
features that are not evident in the power spectrum or related measures. Although the 
equations for the autoregressive coefficients aj and bj, k are linear, the estimates of these 
parameters are often unstable, essentially because a large number of them must be 
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estimated often resulting in significant estimation errors. This means that all linear 
predictive systems tend to break down once a rationalization loop has been generated. As 
parameters of the volatility driving process, which are used to extricate the implied 
volatility on the longer term options from the implied volatility on the short-term ones, 
are estimated by an AR1 model, which belongs to the class of regression models 
collectively referred to as the GLIM (General Linear Model), the parameter estimates go 
‘out of sync’ with those predicted by a theoretical pricing model. 
     Unfortunately, there is no straightforward method to distinguish linear time series 
models (H0) from non-linear alternatives (HA). The approach generally taken is to test the 
H0 of linearity against a pre-chosen particular non-linear HA. Using the classical theory of 
statistical hypothesis testing, several test statistics have been developed for this purpose. 
They can be classified as Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests, likelihood ratio (LR) tests and 
Wald (W) tests. The LR test requires estimation of the model parameters both under H0 
and HA, whereas the LM test requires estimation only under H0. Hence in case of a 
complicated, non-linear HA containing many more parameters as compared to the model 
under H0, the LM test is far more convenient to use. On the other hand, the LM test is 
designed to reveal specific types of non-linearities. The test may also have some power 
against inappropriate alternatives.  However, there may at the same time exist alternative 
non-linear models against which an LM test is not powerful. Thus rejecting H0 on the 
basis of such a test does not permit robust conclusions about the nature of the non-
linearity. One possible solution to this problem is using a W test which estimates the 
model parameters under a well-specified non-linear HA [14]. 
 
 3. The Zadeh argument revisited  
 
  In the face of non-linear feedback processes generated by dissonant information 
sources, even mathematically sound rule-based reasoning schemes often tend to break 
down. As a pertinent illustration, we take Zadeh’s argument against the well-known 
Dempster’s rule [15] [16]. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2 … θn} stand for a set of n mutually exhaustive, 
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elementary events that cannot be precisely defined and classified making it impossible to 
construct a larger set Θref of disjoint elementary hypotheses.  
 The assumption of exhaustiveness is not a strong one because whenever θj, j = 1, 2 … n 
does not constitute an exhaustive set of elementary events, one can always add an extra 
element θ0 such that θj, j = 0, 1 … n describes an exhaustive set. Then, if Θ is considered 
to be a general frame of discernment of the problem under consideration, a map m (.): DΘ 
→ [0, 1] may be defined associated with a given body of evidence B that can support 
paradoxical information as follows: 
 
                                    m (φ) = 0                            (5)    
                                    ΣA∈DΘ m (A) = 1                (6) 
  
 Then m (A) is called A’s basic probability number. In line with the Dempster-Shafer 
Theory, the belief and plausibility functions are defined as follows: 
 
                 Bel (A) = ΣB∈DΘ, B⊆A m (B)                  (7)                                                                        
                  Pl (A) = ΣB∈DΘ, B∩A ≠ φ m (B)               (8)                                                                               
 
 Now let Bel1 (.) and Bel2 (.) be two belief functions over the same frame of discernment 
Θ and their corresponding information granules m1 (.) and m2 (.). Then the combined 
global belief function is obtained as Bel1 (.) = Bel1 (.) ⊕ Bel2 (.) by combining the 
information granules m1 (.) and m2 (.) as follows for m (φ) = 0 and for any C ≠ 0 and C ⊆ 
Θ; 
 
[m1 ⊕ m2] (C)  = [ΣA∩B=C m1 (A) m2 (B)] / [1 - ΣA∩B = φ m1 (A) m2 (B)]                               
(9) 
 
 The summation notation ΣA∩B=C is necessarily interpreted as the sum over all A, B ⊆ Θ 
such that A ∩ B = C. The orthogonal sum m (.) is considered a basic probability 
assignment if and only if the denominator in equation (5) is non-zero. Otherwise the 
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orthogonal sum m (.) does not exist and the bodies of evidences B1 and B2 are said to be 
in full contradiction.  
 Such a case can arise when there exists A ⊂ Θ such that Bel1 (A) =1 and Bel2 (Ac) = 1 – 
a problem associated with optimal Bayesian information fusion rule (Dezert, 2001). 
Extending Zadeh’s argument to option market anomalies, if we now assume that under 
conditions of asymmetric market information, two market players with homogeneous 
expectations view implied volatility on the long-term options. One of them sees it as 
either arising out of (A) current excursion in implied volatility on short-term options with 
probability 0.99 or out of (C) random white noise with probability of 0.01. The other sees 
it as either arising out of (B) historical pattern of implied volatility on short-run options 
with probability 0.99 or out of (C) random white noise with probability of 0.01.  
 Using Dempster’s rule of combination, the unexpected final conclusion boils down to the 
expression m (C) = [m1 ⊕ m2] (C) = 0.0001/(1 – 0.0099 – 0.0099 – 0.9801) = 1 i.e. the 
determinant of implied volatility on long-run options is random white noise with absolute 
certainty!   
 To deal with this information fusion problem a new combination rule has been proposed 
under the name of Dezert-Smarandache combination rule of paradoxical sources of 
evidence, which looks for the optimal combination i.e. the basic probability assignment 
m (.) = m1 (.) ⊕ m2 (.) that maximizes the joint entropy of the two information sources 
[17].  
 The Zadeh illustration originally sought to bring out the fallacy of automated reasoning 
based on the Dempster’s rule and showed that some form of the degree of conflict 
between the sources must be considered before applying the rule. However, in the context 
of financial markets this assumes a great amount of practical significance in terms of how 
it might explain some of the recurrent anomalies in rule-based information processing by 
inter-related market players in the face of apparently conflicting knowledge sources. The 
traditional conflict between the fundamental analysts and the technical analysts over the 
credibility of their respective knowledge sources is of course all too well known!  
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4. Market Information Reconciliation Based on the Concept of Neutrosophic Risk 
 
 Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that is concerned with neutralities and their 
interaction with various ideational spectra. Let T, I, F be real subsets of the non-standard 
interval ]-0, 1+[. If ε > 0 is an infinitesimal such that for all positive integers n and we 
have |ε| < 1/n, then the non-standard finite numbers 1+ = 1+ε and 0- = 0-ε form the 
boundaries of the non-standard interval ]-0, 1+[. Statically, T, I, F are subsets while 
dynamically they may be viewed as set-valued vector functions. If a logical proposition is 
said to be t% true in T, i% indeterminate in I and f% false in F then T, I, F are referred to 
as the neutrosophic components. Neutrosophic probability is useful to events that are 
shrouded in a veil of indeterminacy like the actual implied volatility of long-term options. 
As this approach uses a subset-approximation for truth-values, indeterminacy and falsity-
values it provides a better approximation than classical probability to uncertain events. 
 The neutrosophic probability approach also makes a distinction between “relative sure 
event”, event that is true only in certain world(s): NP (rse) = 1, and “absolute sure event”, 
event that is true for all possible world(s): NP (ase) =1+. Similar relations can be drawn 
for “relative impossible event” / “absolute impossible event” and “relative indeterminate 
event” / “absolute indeterminate event”. In case where the truth- and falsity-components 
are complimentary i.e. they sum up to unity, and there is no indeterminacy and one is 
reduced to classical probability. Therefore, neutrosophic probability may be viewed as a 
generalization of classical and imprecise probabilities. [18] 
 When a long-term option priced by the collective action of the market players is 
observed to be deviating from the theoretical price, three possibilities must be considered: 
 (1) The theoretical price is obtained by an inadequate pricing model, which means that 
the market price may well be the true price,  
 (2) An unstable rationalization loop has taken shape that has pushed the market price of 
the option ‘out of sync’ with its true price, or 
 (3) The nature of the deviation is indeterminate and could be due to either (a) or (b) or a 
super-position of both (a) and (b) and/or due to some random white noise. 
 However, it is to be noted that in none of these three possible cases are we referring to 
the efficiency or otherwise of the market as a whole. The market can only be as efficient 
 82
as the information it gets to process. We term the systematic risk associated with the 
efficient market as resolvable risk. Therefore, if the information about the true price of 
the option is misleading (perhaps due to an inadequate pricing model), the market cannot 
be expected to process it into something useful – after all, the markets can’t be expected 
to pull jack-rabbits out of empty hats! The perceived risk resulting from the imprecision 
associated with how human psycho-cognitive factors subjectively interpret information 
and use the processed information in decision-making is what we term as irresolvable (or 
neutrosophic) risk.  
 
 With T, I, F as the neutrosophic components, let us now define the following events: 
 
H = {p: p is the true option price determined by the theoretical pricing model} and  
 
M = {p: p is the true option price determined by the prevailing market price}                             
(10) 
               
 Then there is a t% chance that the event (H ∩ Mc) is true, or corollarily, the 
corresponding complimentary event (Hc ∩ M) is untrue, there is a f% chance that the 
event (Mc ∩ H) is untrue, or corollarily, the complimentary event (M ∩ Hc) is true and 
there is a i% chance that neither (H ∩ Mc) nor (M ∩ Hc) is true/untrue; i.e. the 
determinant of the true market price is indeterminate. This would fit in nicely with 
possibility (c) enumerated above – that the nature of the deviation could be due to either 
(a) or (b) or a super-position of both (a) and (b) and/or due to some random white noise.  
 Illustratively, a set of AR1 models used to extract the mean reversion parameter driving 
the volatility process over time have coefficients of determination in the range say 
between 50%-70%, then we can say that t varies in the set T (50% - 70%). If the 
subjective probability assessments of well-informed market players about the weight of 
the current excursions in implied volatility on short-term options lie in the range say 
between 40%-60%, then f varies in the set F (40% - 60%). Then unexplained variation in 
the temporal volatility driving process together with the subjective assessment by the 
market players will make the event indeterminate by either 30% or 40%. Then the 
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neutrosophic probability of the true price of the option being determined by the 
theoretical pricing model is NP (H ∩ Mc) = [(50 – 70), (40 – 60), {30, 40}].  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Finally, in terms of our behavioral conceptualization of the market anomaly primarily as 
manifestation of mass cognitive dissonance, the joint neutrosophic probability NP (H ∩ 
Mc) will also be indicative of the extent to which an unstable rationalization loop has 
formed out of such mass cognitive dissonance that is causing the market price to deviate 
from the true price of the option. Obviously increasing strength of the non-linear 
feedback process fuelling the rationalization loop will tend to increase this deviation. As 
human psychology; and consequently a lot of subjectivity; is involved in the process of 
determining what drives the market prices, neutrosophic reasoning will tend to reconcile 
market information much more realistically than classical probability theory. 
Neutrosophic reasoning approach will also be an improvement over rule-based reasoning 
possibly avoiding pitfalls like that brought out by Zadeh’s argument. This has particularly 
significant implications for the vast majority of market players who rely on signals 
generated by some automated trading system following simple rule-based logic.  
 However, the fact that there is inherent subjectivity in processing the price information 
coming out of financial markets, given that the way a particular piece of information is 
subjectively interpreted by an individual investor may not be the globally correct 
interpretation, there is always the matter of irresolvable risk that will tend to pre-dispose 
the investor in favour of some safe investment alternative that offers some protection 
against both resolvable as well as irresolvable risk. This highlights the rapidly increasing 
importance and popularity of safe investment options that are based on some form of 
portfolio insurance i.e. an investment mechanism where the investor has some kind of in-
built downside protection against adverse price movements resulting from erroneous 
interpretation of market information e.g. constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) 
and its generalized form – options based portfolio insurance (OBPI).  Such portfolio 
insurance strategies offer protection against all possible downsides, whether resulting out 
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of resolvable or irresolvable risk, thereby making the investors feel confident about the 
decisions they take. 
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Abstract 
 
Our paper computationally explores Ricker’s predator satiation model with the objective 
of studying how the extinction dynamics of an animal species having a two-stage life-
cycle is affected by a sudden spike in mortality due to an extraneous extreme event. Our 
simulation model has been designed and implemented using sockeye salmon population 
data based on a stochastic version of Ricker’s model; with the shock size being reflected 
by a sudden reduction in the carrying capacity of the environment for this species. Our 
results show that even for a relatively marginal increase in the negative impact of an 
extreme event on the carrying capacity of the environment, a species with an otherwise 
stable population may be driven close to extinction. 
 
Key words: Ricker’s model, extinction dynamics, extreme event, Monte Carlo 
simulation 
 
 
Background and research objective 
 
PVA approaches do not normally consider the risk of catastrophic extreme events under 
the pretext that no population size can be large enough to guarantee survival of a species 
in the event of a large-scale natural catastrophe. [1] Nevertheless, it is only very intuitive 
that some species are more “delicate” than others; and although not presently under any 
clearly observed threat, could become threatened with extinction very quickly if an 
extreme event was to occur even on a low-to-moderate scale. The term “extreme event” is 
preferred to “catastrophe” because catastrophe usually implies a natural event whereas; 
quite clearly; the chance of man-caused extreme events poses a much greater threat at 
present to a number of animal species as compared to any large-scale natural catastrophe.  
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An animal has a two-stage life cycle when; in the first stage, newborns become immature 
youths and in the second stage; the immature youths become mature adults. Therefore, in 
terms of the stage-specific approach, if Yt denotes the number of immature young in 
stage t and At denotes the number of mature adults, then the number of adults in year t + 
1 will be some proportion of the young, specifically those that survive to the next 
(reproductive) stage. Then the formal relationship between the number of mature adults 
in the next stage and the number of immature youths at present may be written as 
follows: 
 
At + 1 = λYt 
 
Here λ is the survival probability, i.e. it is the probability of survival of a youth to 
maturity. The number of young next year will depend on the number of adults in t: 
 
Yt + 1 = f (At) 
 
Here f describes the reproduction relation between mature adults and next year’s young.  
 
This is a straightforward system of simultaneous difference equations which may be 
analytically solved using a variation of the cobwebbing approach. [2] The solution process 
begins with an initial point (Y1, A1) and iteratively determines the next point (Y2, A2). If 
predator satiation is built into the process, then we simply end up with Ricker’s model: 
 
Yt + 1 = αAte–At/K 
 
Here α is the maximum reproduction rate (for an initial small population) and K is the 
population size at which the reproduction rate is approximately half its maximum [3]. 
Putting β = 1/K we can re-write Ricker’s equation as follows: 
 
Yt + 1 = αAte– βAt 
 
It has been shown that if (Y0, A0) lies within the first of three possible ranges, (Yn, An) 
approaches (0, 0) in successive years and the population becomes extinct. If (Y0, A0) lies 
within the third range then (Yn, An) equilibrate to a steady-state value of (Y*, A*). 
Populations that begin with (Y0, A0) within the second range oscillate between (Y*, 0) 
and (0, A*). Such alternating behavior indicates one of the year classes, or cohorts, 
become extinct while the other persists i.e. adult breeding stock appear only every other 
year. Thus the model reveals that three quite different results occur depending initially 
only on the starting sizes of the population and its distribution among the two stages. [4] 
 
We use the same basic model in our research but instead of analytically solving the 
system of difference equations, we use the same to simulate the population dynamics as a 
stochastic process implemented on an MS-Excel spreadsheet. Rather than using a closed-
form equation like Ricker’s model to represent the functional relationship between Yt + 1 
and At, we use a Monte Carlo method to simulate the stage-transition process within 
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Ricker’s framework; introducing a massive perturbation with a very small probability in 
order to emulate a catastrophic event.[5]  
 
 
Conceptual framework 
 
We have a formulated a stochastic population growth model with an inbuilt capacity to 
generate an extreme event based on a theoretical probability distribution. The non-
stochastic part of the model corresponds to Ricker’s relationship between Yt + 1 and At. 
The stochastic part has to do with whether or not an extreme event occurs at a particular 
time point. The gamma distribution has been chosen to make the probability distribution 
for the extreme event a skewed one as it is likely to be in reality. Instead of analytically 
solving the system of simultaneous difference equations iteratively in some variation of 
the cobwebbing method, we have used them in a spreadsheet model to simulate the 
population growth over a span of ten time periods.  
 
We apply a computational methodology whereby the initial number of immature young is 
hypothesized to either attain the expected number predicted by Ricker’s model or 
drastically fall below that number at the end of every stage, depending on whether an 
extraneous extreme event does not occur or actually occurs. The mortalities as a result of 
an extreme event at any time point is expressed as a percentage of the pristine population 
size for a clearer comparative view.  
 
 
Model building 
 
Among various faunal species, the population dynamics of the sockeye salmon 
(oncorhynchus nerka) has been most extensively studied using Rickert’s model. Salmon 
are unique in that they breed in particular fresh water systems before they die. Their 
offspring migrates to the ocean and upon reproductive maturity, they are guided by a 
hitherto unaccounted instinctive drive to swim back to the very same fresh waters where 
they were born to spawn their own offspring and perish. Salmon populations thus are 
very sensitive to habitat changes and human activities that have a negative impact on 
riparian ecosystems that serve as breeding grounds for salmon can adversely affect the 
peculiar life-cycle of the salmon. Many of the ancient salmon runs (notably those in 
California river systems) have now gone extinct and it is our hypothesis that an even 
seemingly stabilized population can be rapidly driven to extinction due to the effect of an 
extraneous (quite possibly man-made) extreme event with the capacity to cause mass 
mortality. The following table shows the four-year averages of the sockeye salmon 
population in the Skeena river system in British Columbia in the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
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Year Population (in thousands)
1908 1,098 
1912 740 
1916 714 
1920 615 
1924 706 
1928 510 
1932 278 
1936 448 
1940 528 
1944 639 
1948 523 
 
(Source: http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~jmahaffy/courses/s00/math121/lectures/product_rule/product.html#Ricker'sModel) 
 
 
A non-linear least squares best-fit to Ricker’s model is obtained for the above set of data 
is obtained as follows: 
 
Minimize ε2 = 2
1
]}{[∑
=
−−
n
t
A
tt
teAd βα , where dt is the actual population size in year t. 
 
The necessary conditions to the above least squares best-fit problem is obtained as 
follows: 
 
∂(ε2)/∂α = ∂(ε2)/∂β = 0; whereby we get α* ≈ 1.54 and β*  ≈ 7.8 x 10–4   
 
Plugging these parameters into Ricker’s model indeed yields a fairly good approximation 
of the salmon population stabilization in the Skeena river system in the first half of the 
previous century. 
 
As the probability distribution of an extraneous  extreme event is likely to be a highly 
skewed one, we have generated our random variables from the cumulative distribution 
function (cdf) of the gamma distribution rather than the normal distribution. The 
distribution boundaries are fixed by generating random integers in the range 1 to 100 and 
using these random integers to define the shape and scale parameters of the gamma 
distribution. The gamma distribution performs better than the normal distribution when 
the distribution to be matched is highly right-skewed; as is desired in our model. The 
combination of a large variance and a lower limit at zero makes fitting a normal 
distribution rather unsuitable in such cases.[6] The probability density function of the 
gamma distribution is given as follows:  
 
f (x, a, b) = bxaa exab /11)}({ −−−Γ  for x > 0 
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Here α > 0 is the shape parameter and β > 0 is the scale parameter of the gamma 
distribution. The cumulative distribution function may be expressed in terms of the 
incomplete gamma function as follows: 
 
F (x, a, b) = ∫ Γ=
x
abxaduuf
0
)(/)/,()( γ  
 
In our spreadsheet model, we have F (R, R/2, 2) as our cdf of the gamma distribution. 
Here R is an integer randomly sampled from the range 1 to 100. An interesting statistical 
result of having these values for x, α and β is that the cumulative gamma distribution 
value becomes equalized with the value [1 - χ2 (R)] having R degrees of freedom, thus 
allowing χ2 goodness-of-fit tests. [7] 
 
Our model is specifically designed to simulate the extinction dynamics of sockeye 
salmon population using a stochastic version of Ricker’s model; with the shock size 
being based on a sudden reduction in the parameter K i.e. the carrying capacity of the 
environment for this species. The model parameters are same as those of Ricker’s model 
i.e. α and β (which is the reciprocal of K). We have kept α  constant at all times at 1.54, 
which was the least squares best-fit value obtained for that parameter. We have kept a β 
of 0.00078 (i.e. the best-fit value) when no extreme event occurs and have varied the β 
between 0.00195 and 0.0156 (i.e. between 2.5 times to 20 times the best-fit value) for 
cases where an extreme event occurred. We have a third parameter c which is basically a 
‘switching constant’ that determines whether an extreme event occurs or not. The switch 
is turned on triggering an extreme event when a random draw from a cumulative gamma 
distribution yields a value less than or equal to c. Using F (R, R/2, 2) as our cdf of the 
gamma distribution where R is a randomly drawn integer in the range (1, 100) means that 
the cumulative gamma function will randomly select from the approximate interval 0.518 
~ 0.683. By fixing the value of c at 0.5189 in our model we have effectively reduced the 
probability of occurrence of an extreme event to a miniscule magnitude relative to that of 
an extreme event not occurring. We have used the sockeye salmon population data from 
the table presented earlier For each level of the β parameter, we simulated the system and 
observed the maximum possible number of mortalities from an extreme event at that 
level of β. The results are reported below. 
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Results obtained from the simulation model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We made 100 independent simulation runs for each of the eight levels of β. The low 
probability of extreme event assigned in our study yielded a mean of 1.375 for the 
number of observed worst-case scenarios (i.e. situations of maximum mortality) with a 
standard deviation of approximately 0.92. The worst-case scenarios for our choice of 
parameters necessarily occur if the extreme event occurs in the first time point when the 
species population is at its maximum size. Our model shows that in worst-case scenarios, 
the size of surviving population after an extreme event that could seed the ultimate 
recovery of the species to pre-catastrophe numbers (staying within the broad framework 
of Ricker’s model) drops from about 18% of the pristine population size for a shock size 
corresponding to 2.5 times the best-fit β; to only about 0.000005% of the pristine 
population size for a shock size corresponding to 20 times the best-fit β.  
 
Therefore, if the minimum required size of the surviving population is at least say 20% of 
the pristine population in order to survive and recover to pre-catastrophe numbers, the 
species could go extinct if an extreme event caused a little more than two-fold decrease in 
the environmental carrying capacity! Even if the minimum required size for recovery was 
relatively low at say around 2% of the pristine population, an extreme event that caused a 
five-fold decrease in the environmental carrying capacity could very easily force the 
species to the brink of extinction. An immediate course of future extension of our work 
would be allowing the fecundity parameter α to be affected by extreme events as is very 
likely in case of say a large-scale chemical contamination of an ecosystem due to a faulty 
industrial waste-treatment facility.  
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Conclusion 
 
Our study has shown that even for a relatively marginal 2.5-fold decrease in the 
environmental  carrying capacity due to an extreme event, a worst-case scenario could 
mean a mortality figure well above 80% of the pristine population. As a guide for future 
PVA studies we may suggest that one should not be deterred simply by the notion that 
extreme events are uncontrollable and hence outside the purview of computational 
modeling. Indeed the effect of an extreme event can almost always prove to be fatal for a 
species but nevertheless, as our study shows, there is ample scope and justification for 
future scientific enquiries into the relationship between survival probability of a species 
and the adverse impact of an extreme event on ecological sustainability. 
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Abstract 
 
IS projects success is a complex concept, and its evaluation is complicated, unstructured 
and not readily quantifiable. Numerous scientific publications address the issue of 
success in the IS field as well as in other fields. But, little efforts have been done for 
processing indeterminacy and uncertainty in success research. This paper shows a formal 
method for mapping success using Neutrosophic Success Map. This is an emerging tool 
for processing indeterminacy and uncertainty in success research. EIS success have been 
analyzed using this tool. 
 
Keywords: Indeterminacy, Uncertainty, Information Systems Success, Neutrosophic 
logic, Neutrosophic Cognitive Maps, Fuzzy logic, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For academics and practitioners concerned with computer-based Information Systems 
(IS), one central issue is the study of development and implementation project success. 
Literature (Barros et al., 2004; Poon and Wagner, 2001; Rainer and Watson, 1995; 
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Redmil, 1990) suggest that IS projects have lower success rates than other technical 
projects. Irrespective of the accuracy of this presumption, the number of unsuccessful IS 
projects are over the number of successful ones. Therefore, it is worthwhile to develop a 
formal method for mapping success, since proper comprehension of the complex nature 
of IS success is critical for the successful application of technical principles to this 
discipline.  
To increase the chances of an IS project to be perceived as successful for people involved 
in project, it is necessary to identify at the outset of the project what factors are important 
and influencing that success. These are the Critical Success Factors (CSF) of the project. 
Whereas several CSF analyses appear in the literature, most of them do not have any 
technical background. In addition, almost none of them focus on relations between them. 
In addition, it is important to discover the relationships between them. Research about it 
was becoming scarce.  
In this paper, we propose the use of an innovative technique for processing uncertainty 
and indeterminacy to set success maps in IS projects. The main strengths of this paper are 
two-folds: it provides a method for processing indeterminacy and uncertainty within 
success and it also allows building a success map. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 shows previous research; 
Section 3 reviews cognitive maps and its evolution; Section 4 is focused on the research 
model; Section 5 presents and analyzes the results; the final section shows the paper’s 
conclusions. 
 
2. Previous research 
 
Success is not depending to just one issue. Complex relations of interdependence exist 
between IS, organization, and users. Thus, for example, reducing costs in an organization 
cannot be derived solely from IS implementation. Studies indicate that the IS success is 
hard to assess because it represent a vague topic that does not easily lend itself to direct 
measurement (DeLone and McLean, 1992).  
According to Zviran and Erlich (2003), academics tried to assess the IS success as a 
function of cost-benefit (King and Schrems, 1978), information value (Epstein and King, 
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1983; Gallagher, 1974), or organization performance (Turner, 1982). System acceptance 
(Davis, 1989) has used for it too. Anyway, cost-benefit, information value, system 
acceptance, and organization performance are difficult to apply as measures. 
Critical Success Factor method (Rockart, 1979) have been used as a mean for identifying 
the important elements of IS success since 1979. It was developed as a method to enable 
CEOs to recognize their own information needs so that IS could be built to meet those 
needs. This concept has received a wide diffusion among IS scholars and practitioners 
(Butler and Fitzgerald, 1999).  
Numerous scientific publications address the issue of CSF in the IS field as well as in 
other fields. But, little efforts have been done for introducing formal methods in success 
research. Some authors (Poon and Wagner, 2001) analysed some aspects of CSF just by 
the use of personal interviews, whereas others (Ragahunathan et al., 1989) carried out a 
Survey-based field study. Interviews and/or questionnaires are common tools for 
measuring success. However, formal methodology is not usual.  
On the other hand, Salmeron and Herrero (2005) propose a hierarchical model to model 
success. Anyway, indeterminacy was not processed. Therefore, we think that a formal 
method to process indeterminacy and uncertainty in IS success is an useful endeavour. 
 
 
3. Uncertainty and Indeterminacy processing in cognitive maps 
 
3.1. Cognitive mapping 
 
A cognitive map shows a representation of how humans think about a particular issue, by 
analyzing, arranging the problems and graphically mapping concepts that are connected 
between them. In addition, it identifies causes and effects and explains causal links (Eden 
and Ackermann, 1992). The cognitive maps study perceptions about the world and the 
way they act to reach human desires within their world. Kelly (1955, 1970) gives the 
foundation for this theory, based on a particular cognitive psychological body of 
knowledge. The base postulate for the theory is that “a person’s processes are 
psychologically canalized by the ways in which he anticipates events.”  Mental models of 
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top managers in firms operating in a competitive environment have been studied (Barr et 
al., 1992) using cognitive mapping. They suggest that the cognitive models of these 
managers must take into account significant new areas of opportunity or technological 
developments, if they want stay ahead. In this sense, it is critical to consider mental 
models in success research. 
 
3.2. Neutrosophic Cognitive Maps (NCM)  
 
In fact, success is a complex concept, and its evaluation is complicated, unstructured and 
not readily quantifiable. The NCM model seems to be a good choice to deal with this 
ambiguity. NCM are flexible and can be customised in order to consider the CSFs of 
different IT projects. 
Neutrosophic Cognitive Maps (Vasantha-Kandasamy and Smarandache, 2003) is based 
on Neutrosophic Logic (Smarandache, 1999) and Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. Neutrosophic 
Logic emerges as an alternative to the existing logics and it represents a mathematical 
model of uncertainty, and indeterminacy. A logic in which each proposition is estimated 
to have the percentage of truth in a subset T, the percentage of indeterminacy in a subset 
I, and the percentage of falsity in a subset F, is called Neutrosophic Logic. It uses a subset 
of truth (or indeterminacy, or falsity), instead of using a number, because in many cases, 
humans are not able to exactly determine the percentages of truth and of falsity but to 
approximate them: for example a proposition is between 30-40% true. The subsets are not 
necessarily intervals, but any sets (discrete, continuous, open or closed or half-open/ half-
closed interval, intersections or unions of the previous sets, etc.) in accordance with the 
given proposition. A subset may have one element only in special cases of this logic. It is 
imperative to mention here that the Neutrosophic logic is a strait generalization of the 
theory of Intuitionistic Fuzzy Logic.  
Neutrosophic Logic which is an extension/combination of the fuzzy logic in which 
indeterminacy is included. It has become very essential that the notion of neutrosophic 
logic play a vital role in several of the real world problems like law, medicine, industry, 
finance, IT, stocks and share, and so on. Fuzzy theory measures the grade of membership 
or the non-existence of a membership in the revolutionary way but fuzzy theory has 
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failed to attribute the concept when the relations between notions or nodes or concepts in 
problems are indeterminate. In fact one can say the inclusion of the concept of 
indeterminate situation with fuzzy concepts will form the neutrosophic concepts (there 
also is the neutrosophic set, neutrosophic probability and statistics). 
In this sense, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps mainly deal with the relation / non-relation between 
two nodes or concepts but it fails to deal with the relation between two conceptual nodes 
when the relation is an indeterminate one. Neutrosophic logic is the only tool known to 
us, which deals with the notions of indeterminacy. 
A Neutrosophic Cognitive Map (NCM) is a neutrosophic directed graph with concepts 
like policies, events, etc. as nodes and causalities or indeterminates as edges. It represents 
the causal relationship between concepts. A neutrosophic directed graph is a directed 
graph in which at least one edge is an indeterminacy denoted by dotted lines. 
Let C1, C2,…, Cn denote n nodes, further we assume each node is a neutrosophic vector 
from neutrosophic vector space V. So a node Ci will be represented by (x1, …,xn) where 
xk’s are zero or one or I (I is the indeterminate introduced before) and xk = 1 means that 
the node Ck is in the on state and xk =0 means the node is in the off state and xk = I means 
the nodes state is an indeterminate at that time or in that situation. 
Let Ci and Cj denote the two nodes of the NCM. The directed edge from Ci to Cj denotes 
the causality of Ci on Cj called connections. Every edge in the NCM is weighted with a 
number in the set {-1, 0, 1, I}. Let eij be the weight of the directed edge CiCj, eij Є {-
1,0,1,I}. eij = 0 if Ci does not have any effect on Cj, eij = 1 if increase (or decrease) in Ci 
causes increase (or decreases) in Cj, eij = –1 if increase (or decrease) in Ci causes decrease 
(or increase) in Cj. eij = I if the relation or effect of Ci on Cj is an indeterminate.  
The edge eij takes values in the fuzzy causal interval [–1, 1] (eij = 0 indicates no causality, 
eij > 0 indicates causal increase; that Cj increases as Ci increases and Cj decreases as Ci 
decreases, eij < 0 indicates causal decrease or negative causality Cj decreases as Ci 
increases or Cj, increases as Ci decreases. Simple FCMs have edge value in {-1, 0, 1}. 
Thus if causality occurs it occurs to maximal positive or negative degree. 
It is important to note that eij measures only absence or presence of influence of the node 
Ci on Cj but till now any researcher has not contemplated the indeterminacy of any 
relation between two nodes Ci and Cj. When we deal with unsupervised data, there are 
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situations when no relation can be determined between some two nodes. In our view this 
will certainly give a more appropriate result and also caution the user about the risks and 
opportunities of indeterminacy. 
Using NCM is possible to build a Neutrosophic Success Map (NSM). NSM nodes 
represent Critical Success Factors (CSF). They are the limited number of areas in which 
results, if they are satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive performance for the 
organization. They are the few key areas where “things must go right” for the project 
(Rockart, 1979). This tool shows the relations and the fuzzy values within in an easy 
understanding way. This is an useful approach for non-technical decision makers. At the 
same time, it allows computation as FCM. Figure 1 shows the NSM static context. 
 
 
Figure 1: NSM static context 
 
5. Building a NSM 
 
EIS project have been used for building a Neutrosophic Success Map. EIS, or executive 
support systems as they are sometimes called, can be defined as computer-based 
information systems that support communications, coordination, planning and control 
functions of managers and executives in organizations (Salmeron and Herrero, 2005).  
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NSM will be based on textual descriptions given by EIS experts on interviews with them. 
The steps followed are: 
1) Experts selection. It is critical step. Expert selection was based on specific 
knowledge of EIS systems. Experts are 19 EIS users of leading companies and 
EIS researchers. The composition of the respondents is important. Multiple 
choices were contemplated. The main selection criterion considered was 
recognized knowledge in research topic, absence of conflicts of interest and 
geographic diversity. All conditions were respected. In addition, respondents were 
not chosen just because they are easily accessible. 
2) Identification of CSF influencing the EIS systems.  
3) Identification and assess of causal relationships among these CSF. Indeterminacy 
relations are included.  
Experts discover the CSFs and give qualitative estimates of the strengths associated with 
causal links between nodes representing these CSFs. These estimates, often expressed in 
imprecise or fuzzy/neutrosophic linguistic terms, are translated into numeric values in the 
range –1 to 1. In addition, indeterminacy is used for modelling that kind of relations 
relationships among nodes.  
The nodes (CSFs) discover was the following: 
1. Users’ involvement (x1). It is defined as a mental or psychological state of users 
toward the system and its development process. It is generally accepted that IS 
users’ involvement in the application design and implementation is important and 
necessary (Hwang and Thorn, 1999). It is essential in maintenance phase too. 
2. Speedy prototype development (x2). It encourages the right information needs 
because it interacts between user and system as soon as possible.  
3. Top management support (x3). EIS support with his/her authority and influence 
over the rest of the executives. 
4. Flexible system (x4). EIS must be flexible enough to be able to get adapted to 
changes in the types of problems and the needs of information. 
5. Right information requirements (x5). Eliciting requirements is one of the most 
complicated tasks in developing EIS and getting a correct requirement set is 
challenging. 
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6. Technological integration (x6). EIS tool selected must be integrated in companies’ 
technological environment.  
7. Balanced development team (x7). Suitable human resources are required for 
developing EIS. Technical background and business knowledge are needed. 
8. Business value (x8). The system must solve a critical business problem. There 
should be a clear business value in EIS use.  
9. Change management (x9). It is the process of developing a planned approach to 
change in a firm. EIS will be a new way of working. Typically the objective is to 
maximize the collective efforts of all people involved in the change and minimize 
the risk of failure of EIS project.  
 
The NSM find out is presented in Figure 2. Fuzzy values are included.  
 
Figure 2. EIS NSM 
 
The adjacency matrix associated to NSM is N(E).  
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The stronger relations are between x5 to x8, x7 to x5 and x8 to x3. It follows that a balanced 
development team has a positive influence over elicitation requirements process. In the 
same sense, eliciting right requirements have a positive influence over system business 
value and system business value over top management support. In addition, users’ 
involvement receives influence from six nodes.  
On the other hand, we have found two neutrosophic relations between x4 to x9, x5 to x3 
and x7 to x9. It follows that experts perceive indeterminacy in relations between EIS 
flexibility and balanced team skills to change management. They can not to assess the 
relation between them, but they perceive that relation could exist. It is an useful 
information since the decision-makers can be advised from it. They will be able to be 
careful with those relations. 
In addition, NSM predict effects of one or more CSFs (nodes) in the regarding ones. If 
we know that any CSFs are on, we can discover the influence over the others. This 
process is similar in Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. 
Let   ,..., , 13221 nn CCCCCC − be cycle (Vasantha-Kandasamy and Smarandache, 2003), 
when Ci is switched on and if the causality flow through the edges of a cycle and if it 
again causes Ci, we say that the dynamical system goes round and round. This is true for 
any node Ci, for i = 1, 2,…, n. the equilibrium state for this dynamical system is called 
the hidden pattern. If the equilibrium state of a dynamical system is a unique state vector, 
then it is called a fixed point. If the NSM settles with a state vector repeating in the form 
x1 → x2 → … → xi → x1, 
then this equilibrium is called a limit cycle of the NSM.  
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Let C1, C2,…, Cn be the CSFs of an NSM. Let E be the associated adjacency matrix. Let 
us find the hidden pattern when x1 is switched on when an input is given as the vector A1 
= (1, 0, 0,…, 0), the data should pass through the neutrosophic matrix N(E), this is done 
by multiplying A1 by the matrix N(E). Let A1N(E) = (a1, a2,…, an) with the threshold 
operation that is by replacing ai by 1 if ai > k and ai by 0 if ai < k and ai by I if ai is not a 
integer.  
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This procedure is repeated till we get a limit cycle or a fixed point. According to this, the 
limit cycle or a fixed point of vector state of each CSFs is calculated with k=0.5. We take 
the state vector A1 = (1 0 0 0 0 0 0). We will see the effect of A1 over the model. 
 
( ) ( ) 21 1000000116.00000008.00)( AENA =⎯→⎯=  
( ) ( ) 232 1000000116.00002.0008.08.0)( AAENA ==⎯→⎯=
 
A2 is a fixed point. According with experts the on state of users’ involvement has effect 
over speedy prototype development and change management.  
We take the new state vector A1 = (1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0). We will see the effect of users’ 
involvement and top management support (A1) over the model. 
 
( ) ( ) 21 1000001116.00002.0008.09.0)( AENA =⎯→⎯=  
( ) ( ) 232 1000001116.00002.0008.07.1)( AAENA ==⎯→⎯=
 
Thus A2=(1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1), according with experts the on state of users’ involvement 
and top management support have effects over the prototype speed of development (x2) 
and change management (x9). It is interesting to discover that both previous state vectors 
have the same influence over the model. Both vector states have influence over prototype 
speed of development (x2) and change management, but no direct effect over the rest of 
CSFs. 
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The vector states described are only two of the several available, even vectors with 
several CSFs on. However the proposal here presented is as simple as possible while 
being consistent with the process, data gathered from the expert’s perceptions, and the 
aims and objectives of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The main strengths of this paper are two-folds: it provides a method for project success 
mapping and it also allows know CSF effects over the other ones. In this paper, we 
proposed the use of the Neutrosophic Success Maps to map EIS success.  
A tool for evaluating suitable success models for IS projects is required due to the 
increased complexity and uncertainty associated to this kind of projects. This leads to the 
innovative idea of adapting and improving the existent Neutrosophic theories for their 
application to indicators of success for IS projects. 
Neutrosophic Success Map is an innovative success research approach. NSM is based on 
Neutrosophic Cognitive Map. The concept of NCM can be used in modelling of systems 
success, since the concept of indeterminacy play a role in that topic. This was our main 
aim is to use NCMs in place of FCMs. When an indeterminate causality is present in an 
FCM we term it as an NCM.  
The results not mean that any CSF is unimportant or has not effect over the model. It 
means what are the respondents’ perceptions about the relationships of them. This is a 
main issue, since it is possible to manage the development process with more information 
about the expectations of final users. 
Anyway, more research is needed about Neutrosophic logic limit and applications. 
Incorporating the analysis of NCM and NSM, the study proposes an innovative way for 
success research. We think this is an useful endeavour. 
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Computational models pervade all branches of the exact sciences and have in recent 
times also started to prove to be of immense utility in some of the traditionally 'soft' 
sciences like ecology, sociology and politics. This volume is a collection of a few 
cutting-edge research papers on the application of variety of computational models 
and tools in the analysis, interpretation and solution of vexing real-world 
problems and issues in economics, management, ecology and global politics by some 
prolific researchers in the concerned fields. 
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